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FROM ANKARA TO STRASBOURG:
DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE
SUPRANATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGY FOR
PATRIARCHAL PRESERVATION IN TURKEY
Joshua B. Gessling*

Introduction
That is no country for old men. The young
In one another's arms, birds in the trees
- Those dying generations- at their song,
The salmon-falls, the mackerel-crowded seas,
Fish, flesh, or fowl, commend all summer long
Whatever is begotten, born and dies.
Caught in that sensual music all neglect
Monuments of unageing intellect.
An aged man is but a paltry thing,
A tattered coat upon a stick, unless
Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing
For every tatter in its mortal dress,
Nor is there singing school but studying
Monuments of its own magnificence;
And therefore I have sailed the seas and come
To the holy city of Byzantium ....
In an age of both multiculturalism and religious reawakening, the
legal status of religious minorities and institutions is an issue of critical
importance. Mosques in Christian Europe and churches in Muslim Europe
present serious issues of governmental obligation and tolerance. With the
* University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida, LL.M., International Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida, J.D., University
of Southern Indiana, Evansville, Indiana, B.S., Political Science. Mr. Gessling's
practice with the Law Office of Michael J. Reppas, P.A. in Miami Lakes, Florida
consists of commercial litigation and international law. The author would like to
acknowledge and thank Michael J. Reppas, II and Professor David E. Abraham for
their comments and suggestions throughout the preparation of this article, and Jill
M. Titzer and Ethan Kraybill for their editorial assistance.
I WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Sailing to Byzantium, in THE TOWER: A FACSIMILE
EDITION 1, 1-2 (Scribner 2004) (1928).
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advent and expanding influence of supranational adjudicatory mechanisms
such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), minorities, oftentimes underrepresented by governing regimes in their respective homelands,
are increasingly turning away from their domestic courts and traveling
across borders to seek justice.
The modern Republic of Turkey and its native minority religious
institutions continue to provide the world with a glimpse of this fascinating
supranational, socio-political experiment at work, one that has meshed the
remnants of an authoritarian Islamic monarchy with a modern democratic
model of government to become one of the world's first predominantly
Muslim, secular democracies. This ongoing endeavor is primarily the product of a joint venture between the West and Turkey, with intermittent lulls
and fluctuating levels of commitment, to bridge the two regions through the
politics of European integration. 2 This very process of political unification,
however, has exposed reasons for grave international concern regarding the
Turkish Republic's failure to commit to certain fundamental democratic
principles and ideals, such as protection of the rule of law, preservation of
human rights, and observance of religious freedom. 3 This article will address the latter of these concerns, religious freedom, with a specific focus
on the mistreatment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (Istanbul) and the Orthodox Church of Constantinople (Istanbul). Developing
a practical strategy to counter this state- sponsored intolerance is undoubtedly more important today than ever before. Indeed, without hurried concessions on behalf of the Turkish government, it is very likely that the
Ecumenical Patriarchate and Orthodox Church, whose origins are traced to
the reign of the Byzantine Empire, will die at the hands of governmental
suppression within a matter of mere years, not decades.
To save these storied, minority religious institutions from this illfated but preventable outcome, this article will propose a comprehensive
See generally S. Cagri Gulsen, Turkey-EU Relations within the Context of European Integration (Aug., 2004) (unpublished Graduate School of Social and Behavioral Sciences Thesis, University of Leiden) (on file with author). This
transition toward "Europeanism" began shortly after the Republic's formation, and
has generally strengthened since the mid-twentieth century. Id. at 11-19.
3 See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TURKEY 2005 PROGRESS REPORT, COM
(2005) 561 final (Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter TURKEY 2005 PROGRESS REPORT],
available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key-documents/2005/
package/sec_1426_final-progress-report-tren.pdf (last visited March 1, 2009).
See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURKEY: COUNTRY SUMMARY (Jan. 2008), available at http:hrw.org/wr2k8/pdfs/turkey.pdf (last visited March 1, 2009) (noting that
"Recent trends in human rights protection in Turkey have been retrograde.")
2

2009

FROM ANKARA TO STRASBOURG

supranational litigation strategy to effect necessary change in Turkey. Section One will briefly examine the rise of the Ottoman Empire and the evolution of the modern Turkish Republic, and introduce the Orthodox Church
and Ecumenical Patriarchate. This historical context is necessary to appreciate the religious and cultural clash occurring within Turkey today; it also
provides crucial insight into the troubled relationship between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the modern Turkish Republic, including the distrust
with which they generally view one another.
Section Two will assess the two measures that have offered limited
protection for the Ecumenical Patriarchate and religious minorities during
the reign of the modem Republic: the Treaty of Lausanne4 and European
diplomacy. Although the Treaty of Lausanne has provided a general framework for the treatment of minorities in Turkey since the inception of the
modem regime, it is the opinion of this author that it is intrinsically flawed
in design and outdated. Additionally, although European diplomacy has
proved to be quite effective in achieving measurable domestic policy
change within applicant states, including Turkey, the politics of European
integration have yet to produce the results necessary for short-term institutional sustenance for the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Section Three will propose a comprehensive supranational litigation strategy for obtaining certain freedoms and rights necessary to preserve
the Patriarchate in the interim, where the objectives of the Treaty of Lausanne and the long-term visions of European Union (EU) diplomacy have
fallen short. In doing so, the European Convention on Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms will be explored, as will the resident adjudicatory
mechanism, the ECHR. Special focus will be given to what this author
feels is a trilogy of basic rights essential for institutional sustenance in this
case, including the right to educate future religious leadership, the abolishment of severe and arbitrary restrictions placed on religious leadership, and
the preservation of real property ownership rights for minorities and religious institutions in Turkey.

SECTION ONE: EVOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, THE
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY & THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE
OF CONSTANTINOPLE

4

See generally Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923,

28 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Lausanne], available at http://www.lib.byu.

edu/-rdh/wwi/1918p/Lausanne.html (last visited March 1, 2009).
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I.
A.

FORCED MARRIAGE: THE OTTOMAN STATE & ORTHODOX GREEKS

Evolution of the Ottoman State

The very early Turkish conquests of Asia Minor included a series
of sporadic tribal conflicts throughout the region that spanned the course of
several centuries. 5 Most notably, in 1071, Turkish tribes first penetrated the
shield of the Byzantine Empire, which resulted in the initial permanent
lodging of Seljuk Turks in Asia Minor and the establishment of a Turkish
Anatolian Kingdom. 6 However, surrounded by a state of perpetual conflict,
the Seljuk Kingdom failed to preserve its territorial spoils for long. In
1243, the Mongols overcame the Seljuk State at the Battle of Kose Dag.
Soon thereafter, other Turkish tribes took advantage of the Kingdom's
weakened position and fought to gain additional territories of their own.7 In
just a few short decades, the reign of the Seljuk Turkish Kingdom dis8
integrated, paving the way for the rise of the Ottoman Turks.
The organizing Ottoman tribes soon recognized the opportunity for
territorial advancement and quickly replaced the Seljuk Kingdom as the
dominant regional Turkish influence. Although the Ottomans certainly had
made some modest gains in years prior thereto, the growing Empire soon
set its sights on conquering the remainder of the region controlled by the
Byzantine Empire, the territorial successor to the Roman Empire. Although
at the time the Ottomans were still "only one of a handful of Turkish clans
vying for supremacy on the ruins of the Seljuk State[,]" 9 they were able to
capitalize successfully on "the advantage of bordering on the moribund
Byzantine Empire, which was preoccupied with internal feuding and conflict with the Latin West."' 0 After a lengthy siege of the capital city on May
29, 1453, the Ottomans conquered the last of the Byzantine Empire's most
prized possessions: Constantinople.ll
5

GEORGE S. HARRIS, TURKEY: COPING WITH CRISIS 35

6

Id. at 36.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9
10

Id.

(Westview Press 1985).

Id. at 36-37.

11 FEROZ AHMAD, THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY 19 (Routledge 1993).
Greeks have inhabited Asia Minor prior to, for the duration of, and since the fall of,
the Roman Empire. See DAVID HOLDEN, GREECE WITHOUT COLUMNS: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN GREEKS

68-83 (J.B. Lippincott Company 1972). When the

Western Roman Empire collapsed, Byzantium, which had been named the capital
of the Eastern Roman Empire by Constantine in 330 A.D., remained as the seat of
the Byzantine Empire. See id. Only after the total disintegration of the remnants of
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By the late sixteenth century, and throughout the seventeenth century, the Empire experienced great turbulence; at times, the Ottomans
seemed to lose influence over their annexes as quickly as they had once
conquered them. 12 These periods of consistent decline eventually encouraged the Ottoman ruling class to attempt the implementation of a wide
spectrum of reforms. 3 Nevertheless, the state adapted slowly, and during
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Ottomans witnessed
massive military defeats, additional losses of territory, and severe fiscal
crisis. 14

the Roman Empire, and following the long and storied reign of the Byzantine Empire, did the Ottomans successfully lay siege to Constantinople. See RICHARD
CLOGG, A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE 16 (Cambridge University Press
1979) [hereinafter CLOOG, A SHORT HISTORY]. With his victory at Constantinople,
Mehmet II, "became the master of a great city with a long imperial tradition and the
absolute ruler of a centrali[z]ed empire." AHMAD, supra. Interestingly, the raid of
Constantinople could easily have not occurred, had an opposition group close to the
Ottoman ruler gotten its way. See id. Within the Ottoman confederation, there
existed a serious political debate regarding whether invasion was desirable. See id.
The "devshirme" group supported the attack of the city, arguing "that its capture
would strengthen their [Ottoman] position and destroy their rivals." Id. While the
"notables" conceded that reign over Constantinople would greatly extend Ottoman
influence, they feared "an assault on Constantinople would provoke a major European crusade which the Ottomans might not be able to withstand." Id. Obviously
Mehmet 1I carried out the invasion, and the fears of opposition to Mehmet went
largely unrealized. Additionally, after the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottomans usurped the fragmented lands held by their Turkish brethren. See SINA AKSIN, TURKEY: FROM EMPIRE TO REVOLUTIONARY REPUBLIC 6 (Dexter H.
Mursaloglu trans., N.Y.U. Press 2007). These incursions included the taking of
Syria, Arabia, and Egypt. Id.
12 See Talip Kucukcan, State, Islam, and Religious Liberty in Modern Turkey:
Reconfiguration of Religion in the Public Sphere, 2003 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 475, 477
(2003). At the height of Ottoman expansion, the Empire had conquered and controlled huge sums of territory, including modem Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Syria,
Arabia, and Egypt. See AKSIN, supra note 11. "At its zenith the Empire stretched
from North Africa to the Crimea, from Belgrade to Baghdad, controlling the eastern Mediterranean and the east-west caravan routes." Id.
13 See Kucukcan, supra note 12.
14 See id. The decline of the Ottoman Empire is owed to a culmination of internal
and external complexities. Internally, the Ottoman state was weakened by unorganized and undisciplined administrative practices, a loss of regional economic
positioning, and a failure to maintain rule throughout its territorial holdings. See
HARRIS, supra note 5, at 39. Externally, the Ottoman Turks had lost military prowess, and had become increasingly susceptible to the growing strength of European
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The perpetual trauma inflicted upon the stressed Ottoman dynasty
eventually proved too much to overcome. In response to the unstable geosocio-eco-political climate, factions within the empire in opposition to the
Sultan developed at an even greater rate. These dissenters came to be
known collectively as the initiators of the "Young Turk" movement, which
existed as an organization of diverse Turkish elements that generally desired "to share in power through institutions protected from the arbitrary
intervention of the sultan."' 15 This "movement" consisted of a series of internal revolts aimed at achieving that goal and, though ultimately failing to
fully implement its objectives, the movement left a lasting impression upon
the modern Republic of Turkey. 16 "Intellectual and cultural advances promoted by the Young Turks pointed Turkey toward Europe as an inspiration
for reform; at the same time, this orientation further weakened the [Turkish]
religious establishment."' 17 As a result, the fate of the traditional Ottoman
state was officially sealed, and the empire took its first steps toward its
secular and democratic future.
With the conclusion of World War I and the defeat of the Ottomans
in 1918, the Monarchy's control soon ended. Shortly thereafter, the Sultan's Monarchy of the Ottoman Empire was denounced and Mustafa Kemal
(a/k/a "Ataturk") was elected president. In 1923, the' modern Republic of
Turkey was established.' 8 Following the inception of the Republic, Constantinople was renamed by the Turks as it exists today: Istanbul.

military forces, as well as the Russo-Greek alliance. Id. at 39-41. Despite the
reforms implemented in the nineteenth century, known as "Tanzimat" (reordering),
and the promise of greater religious equality, the Ottomans could not control the
growing sense of nationalism within their many respective minority communities.
Id. at 42-43. Before long, Greece achieved independence (in 1830), and Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania soon followed. Id. at 43.
supra note 5,

48-49.
Id. at 53.
17 Id. Additionally, the Turks' involvement in World War I had resulted in massive losses which "demoralized the troops and led to a sense of hopelessness." Id.
at 54. Ultimately, the Turkish "sultan's subservience to the occupying Entente
Powers sealed his doom. In 1922, he too was forced to abandon the throne and
flee." Id. at 55.
15

HARRIS,

at

16

18

SPEROS VRYONIS, JR., THE MECHANISM OF CATASTROPHE: THE TURKISH

6-7, 1955,
32 (Greekworks.com 2005).

GROM OF SEPTEMBER
NITY OF ISTANBUL

PO-

AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE GREEK COMMU-

B.
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The Relationship of the Orthodox Church & the Ottoman State
For twenty-five centuries we Greeks have been here in this
great city. We were the founders of Byzantium, and we are
the children of Byzantium. This is our inheritance. Today
you, my son, call this city Istanbul. But of what do we, the
Greeks, think when you speak of Istanbul? Do we not think
of Constantinopolis - the city of the Emperor Constantine
himself? Yes, for that and no other is where we are; the
very city of Constantine, the father of our Church!
-Patriarch Athenagoras

19

Native to a small portion of what became the conquered land of the
Ottoman Turks after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 are the Orthodox
Church and Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which sit in modern
day Istanbul. Prior to the Ottoman conquest, the Orthodox Church was situated at the heart of the Byzantine Empire, where early in the fourth century
the Roman emperor Constantine recognized Christianity as the official religion of the Empire. 20 This official designation conferred great respect,
1
responsibility and authority upon the leadership of the Church. 2 Significantly, during the reign of the Byzantine Empire, the Patriarchate officially
was declared the "first among equals" in the Eastern Orthodox community's ecclesiastical hierarchy. 22 However, with the fall of Constantinople,
literally overnight the Orthodox Church, which had partnered with the Orthodox state for well over one thousand years prior thereto, formally "became the Church of a subject people '23 in the eyes of the new Ottoman
regime.

19

20

supra note 11, at 68.
Aristeides Papadakis, The HistoricalTradition of Church-State Relations under
HOLDEN,

Orthodoxy, in 1 CHRISTIANITY

UNDER STRESS, EASTERN CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 37 (Pedro Ramet ed., Duke Univ. Press 1988).

See id. at 37-38. The state endorsement mandated that the Orthodox Church
"henceforth was to serve the empire, just as Roman religion had done in the past
was to act as its protector and guardian." Id. at 38.
* . .[while] the empire ...
22 Joanna Balaskas, The InternationalLegal Personality of the Eastern Orthodox
21

Ecumenical Patriarchateof Constantinople, 2

154 (citing

THOMAS

E.

HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP.
FITZGERALD, THE ORTHODOX CHURCH 8 (Greenwood

135,
Press

1995)).
23

STEVEN RUNCIMAN, THE GREAT CHURCH IN CAPTIVITY:

A

STUDY OF THE PA-

TRIARCHATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE FROM THE EVE OF THE TURKISH CONQUEST TO
THE GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

165

(Cambridge Univ. Press

1968).
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Without minimizing the incredible stresses that accompany the violent overthrow of any formerly sovereign government, regime change in
this case may have initially had less of a practical impact on the function of
the Ecumenical Patriarchate than one might expect. There are various reasons for this. First, prior to Mehmet II taking Constantinople in 1453, the
Ottomans had conquered other territories inhabited by Orthodox Christians
24
who lived under the ecclesiastical leadership of the Patriarchal institution.
As a result, the Patriarchate had gained experience in the administration of
ecclesiastical control over subject populations under similar conditions. Interestingly, some commentators have actually suggested that the Ottoman
annexation of fragmented regional territories increased the ecclesiastical
control of the Patriarchate, "because the vast bulk of its territory was reunited under one lay power. ' 25 Theoretically, at least, the administration of
ecclesiastical control became simplified once there was one administrative
authority to which the Patriarchate was subject.
Second, Mehmet II, although a devout Muslim, was a scholar of
Greek culture and took interest in the continued preservation of the Patriarchate. 26 The Ottoman ruler was keenly aware of the political importance
of establishing rule over the Patriarchate's people, and discovered that the
most effective manner in which to accomplish this goal was to implement a
system whereby Christians would maintain significant control over their
own religious communities. 27 To this end, Mehmet II established a millet
(nation; community) system that permitted the religious figurehead of the
Christian community to employ Christian customs and rule of law regardSee id.
Id. at 166.
26 Id. "As a pious Muslim he [, Mehmet II,could not allow the Christians any
part in the higher control of his Empire." Id. at 167. "But he wished them to enjoy
24
25

peace and prosperity and to be content with his government and an asset to it." Id.
27 See RUNCIMAN, supra note 23, at 166-67. Ottoman society borrowed its system
of governance from its Muslim ancestors, and based its early legal system on the
Islamic legal code. See Kucukcan, supra note 12, at 478-79. However, by most
accounts, the Ottomans' brand of governance was quite liberal for its era. AKSIN,
supra note 11. This system not only enabled a level of communal autonomy and
identity, it also permitted many of the Ottomans' minority constituents to achieve
financial success. AHMAD, Making of Modem Turkey, supra note 11, at 21. However, the generosity and leniency extended to minorities by the Ruling Class was
undoubtedly limited in scope. For instance, the system ensured that the Sultan
would always remain as the wealthiest of any person: "If any merchant should
accumulate extraordinary wealth, confiscation would cut him down to size." AKSIN, supra note 11, at 9. Additionally, minorities were never permitted to acquire
political power within the dynasty. AHMAD, supra note 11, at 21.
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ing intra-community issues. 28 In return, the Patriarch was obligated to preserve subservience and allegiance within his community on behalf of the
Ottoman state. 29 This system allowed the Patriarchate to maintain rule and
discipline over its Christian community and act as an intermediary between
its people and the new ruling regime.3 0
Despite the interest of Mehmet II in the preservation of peace and
autonomy on behalf of the Patriarchate, it would be erroneous to suggest
that the Church flourished under the newly imposed millet system. The
leadership of the Church was still forced to seek permission to take action
under certain conditions imposed by the state, even regarding its own community. For instance, the Ottomans required the Patriarchate to acquire permission to build new places of worship and to upgrade facilities in
disrepair. 31 Ottoman rulers forced non-Muslims to wear distinctive costume, and the young sons and daughters of Christian families were often
32
seized and forcibly converted to Islam.
LI.

INCEPTION OF THE MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC & THE

ROAD TO THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE

During the early years of the formation of the Republic, between
the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the eventual rise of the modern Turkish
state, the Greco-Turkish War erupted, which led to the Treaty of Lausupra note 23, at 167. The courts of the Patriarch had exclusive
jurisdiction over matters regarding the clergy, and had full jurisdiction over matters
regarding the Christian community's religious affairs, including marriage, divorce,
guardianship, and certain commercial cases. Id. at 171. Criminal matters, even
amongst the Christian population, were reserved for the courts of the Ottoman
state, unless the accused happened to be part of the clergy. Id. at 172. Additionally, the Patriarch was permitted to levy taxes upon his community to secure funding for the Church, and was exempt from paying taxes in many cases (although
community members remained obligated to pay). Id. at 171-72.
29 RUNCIMAN, supra note 23, at 167.
30 For instance, although the Patriarch was not directly obligated to secure tax
28

RUNCIMAN,

payments from his community, he could be called upon to discipline those within
his community who failed to comply with Ottoman demands for tax payments. Id.
at 172.
31
Id. at 179.
Id. Additionally, Christians were subjected to discrimination in the Islamic
32
courts. "Any lawsuit involving a Christian and a Muslim was heard in a Muslim
court, according to Koranic law; and few Muslim judges were prepared to give a
judgment in favour of an unbeliever." Id.
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sanne.33 This feud was considered by many nationalists to be the Turks'
own "war of independence, ' 34 as it followed closely on the heels of World
War I and the harsh concessions made on the Turks' behalf in the Treaty of
Sevres.3 5 Many of the concessions, unilaterally imposed, fostered resentment amongst the Turks and, consequently, a new feeling of accomplishment in Greece; Turkey had relinquished a great portion of its territory to
the Greeks.3 6 For a brief period following World War I, this heightened
level of nationalism led to Greece's implementing a visionary expansionist
3' 7
effort in Asia Minor coined the "Great Idea.
See RICHARD CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY OF GREECE 98-99 (Cambridge University Press 2nd ed. 2002) [hereinafter CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY]. "In 19111912, the Ottoman Empire fought and lost a war against Italy losing Rhodes and
the other Dodecanese Islands." Scott Keefer, Solving the Greek Turkish Boundary
Dispute, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 55, 56-57 (2003). "Seeing the apparent
weakness of Turkey, the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece then declared
war on the Ottomans." Id. Additionally, with the initiation of World War I, the
Greeks fought on behalf of the Triple Entente, while the Ottomans sided with the
Central Powers. Id. At the conclusion of WWI, "both Greece and Italy landed
troops in Turkey to protect their nationals as the Ottoman Empire collapsed." Id.
"This precipitated the 1920-1922 Greco-Turkish War, ended by the 1923 Treaty of
Lausanne." Id.
31 CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 99.
35 See id. at 93-97. With the Allies' victory at the end of World War I, the Ottomans were forced to agree to the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, whereby the Turks
were to concede Eastern Thrace and Western Asia Minor surrounding Smyrna,
while Constantinople (currently Istanbul) remained in Allied control. See id. However, the Turks never expressly ratified the Treaty and its eventual effect was very
short-lived. Soon thereafter, Turkey launched a devastating and successful military
offensive aimed at regaining its concessions. See id. It was the Treaty of Sevres
which came to be viewed by many Turks as a symbol for Western aggression and a
source of mistrust. See Gulsen, supra note 2, at 12 (referring to the Turkish resentment of the Treaty's terms as the "Sevres Syndrome," which "planted doubts about
the goodwill of Western powers towards the Turks[.]")
36 See CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 93-95. "The treaty [of
Sevres] was greeted with much enthusiasm in Greece ... [where] supporters talked
excitedly of his [, Mr. Venizelos, Greek representative to Treaty in Lausanne negotiations,] having created a Greece of 'the two continents and of the five seas', the
two continents being Europe and Asia and the five seas being the Mediterranean,
the Aegean, the Ionian, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea." Id. at 93, 95.
31 CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 3. The "Great Idea" refers to
Greece's aspiration to unify all areas of Greek settlement in the Near East within
the bounds of a single state with its capital in Constantinople. However, the "Great
Idea" proved to be anything but "great," as the Turks eventually launched an ex33
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Following the Treaty of Sevres, but prior to Lausanne, Greece exer-

cised authority over its newly gained regional annexes with the consent and
backing of the Allied powers. 38 This post-World War I period of Greek
expansion, however, was short lived for a variety of reasons. First, the Allied powers quickly realized that enforcement of the Treaty of Serves would
be far too burdensome in relation to their respective national interest in the
region. 39 Second, under the charismatic leadership of Mustafa Kemal and
the growing tide of nationalism and resentment over concessions of the
Treaty of Sevres, the Turkish state became committed to regaining land
once considered rightfully its own. 40 Third, the Greek military had become
weakened by insufficient training and preparedness, and was left crippled
41
from years of ongoing internal feuding.
Simply, Greece was in no position to defend the conquests of the
Allies alone against the revolt of the Turks. Sensing an opportunity to seize
the prized territories his country had recently surrendered to the demands of
the Western Allies, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) demanded a complete and
unconditional retreat of Greek forces from Asia Minor.42 When Greece
43
failed to comply, the Turks launched a devastating counteroffensive.
tremely successful counteroffensive, and destroyed virtually all gains of the
Greeks. See HOLDEN, supra note 11, at 133.
38 As evidenced by the Greek Army's landing at Smyma. See MICHAEL LLEWELLYN SMITH, IONIAN VISION:

GREECE

IN ASIA MINOR

1919-1922 80-81 (Allen Lane

1973).
See

HOLDEN, supra note 11, at 132-33.
See id.
41
See id.
42 Id. at 133.
43 At this time, Greece was still operating under the assumption that Europe, Britain in particular, was committed to enforcing the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, and
would ultimately defend Greece's interests. However, after the Turkish counteroffensive, Britain failed to come to the aid of Greece, leaving Greece to defend its
position alone. See generally HOLDEN, supra note 11, at 132-34. Holden has commented that, "[1]ike the illegitimate child of some hedgerow affair, modem Greece
was born out of, and into, the politics of irresponsibility." Id. at 116. "At the
moment of union between the Great Powers and the Greeks in which the infant
state was conceived, neither side had shown much concern for the real character
and interests of the other." Id. "The result, as we have just seen, was a bit of a
bastard." Id. "The bitterness and chaos of defeat were compounded by the feeling
that Greece had been abandoned in her hour of greatest need by traditional friends."
CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 98. As a result, Greece was thrown
into a self-destructive internal domestic struggle for identity and power. "It was
perhaps inevitable that there should also be a hunt for domestic scapegoats. Eight

39

40
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Greece's allies refused to come to its aid. As a result, within ten days the
Turks had regained control of the Anatolian region and violently destroyed
the City of Smyrna.44 In the wake of the violence and devastation, an esti45
mated 30,000 civilians were left dead.
The terms of the Treaty of Sevres, the "Great Idea", and the Greeks'
mission in the Near East had all been compromised. The aftermath resulted
in Lausanne and the Conventionfor the Exchange of Populations.46 Additionally, nearly all of Greece's acquisitions at the close of World War I
under the Treaty of Sevres were nullified. 47 Under the terms of the Treaty
of Lausanne, Turkey was invested in all of Asia Minor, Constantinople and
Eastern Thrace, while Greece maintained Western Thrace. 418
As a result of the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, approximately
1,100,000 Christians who once lived in Turkish territory were relocated to
Greece, and roughly 380,000 Muslims who previously resided in Greece
were transferred to Turkey. 49 The population exchange was based wholly
politicians and soldiers, including the military commander in Asia Minor, General
Hadzianestis, were court-martialed on charges of high treason, although it was clear
that there had been no deliberate treachery." Id. Six of the eight accused were
subsequently executed by a firing squad. Id. For an in-depth account of the consequences of the Greek fallout, see generally CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY, supra
note 33.
4 See HOLDEN, supra note 11, at 133. Smyrna came to be known amongst Turks
as "Infidel Izmir." CLOGG, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 11, at 118.
45 See HOLDEN, supra note 11, at 133.
46 See generally ONUR YILDIRIM, DIPLOMACY AND DISPLACEMENT: RECONSIDERING THE TURCO-GREEK EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS,
47

CLOGG,

A

CONCISE HISTORY,

1922-1934 (Routledge 2006).

supra note 33, at 99.

supra note 11, at 135. The Treaty of Lausanne provided a "realistic
settlement to replace the dream world [the respective signatories] had charted three
years earlier in the Treaty of Sevres." Id. at 134. "Turkey in its new nationalist
guise won the whole of Asia Minor for its territory, together with Constantinople
and Eastern Thrace. Greece, in exchange, was awarded Western Thrace; and to
avoid a repetition of the irredentism that had plagued the disputed territories of the
Near East for the previous century, the powers decreed that the two old enemies
should submit to the ruthless form of political surgery known as an 'exchange of
population."' Id at 135.
49 CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 99. Additionally, "there were
approximately 100,000 Greek refugees from revolutionary Russia and from Bulgaria." Id. The majority of refugees were widows or infants, "as a result of the
dislocations consequent on war, flight, and deportation." Id. at 101. "Many of the
refugees knew only Turkish. If they knew Greek, it was frequently ... the dialect
of the Pontos region on the southern shores of the Black Sea, which was scarcely
48
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upon religious affiliation; neither race, nor nationality, nor language was
considered relevant in deciding who would be banished from their respective homelands. 50 This arbitrarily divisive criterion, based solely on religion, created somewhat of an anomaly, as many Greek-speaking Muslims of
Greece were removed to Turkey, and Turkish-speaking Orthodox Greeks of
51
Turkey were involuntarily forced to flee to Greece.

III.

REPUBLIC OF TURKEY'S MISTREATMENT OF THE
ORTHODOX MINORITY

Despite the enormity of the forced mass exodus of populations between the two nations, exempted from the exchange were the Greeks of the
islands of Imvros and Tenedos, the Muslim and predominantly Turkish inhabitants of Greek Thrace, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.5 2 Turkey
failed in its main objective, however, as it had placed the removal of the
Patriarchate atop its list. Prior to the opening of Lausanne negotiations, the
Turkish representative expressly "laid down the removal of the Greek Patriarch and all its institutions from Constantinople as the first condition for the
intelligible to the inhabitants of the [Greek] kingdom .... " Id. "At the end of the
First World War, Greeks had constituted fewer than 20 per cent of the population
of western Thrace .... ." Id. at 104. However, "[o]n the completion of the exchange they made up over 60 percent." Id. As a result of the exchange, Athens
"had become a city of nearly half a million people, but of those only 130,000 or
less than 30 percent, had been born there." HOLDEN, supra note 11, at 135.
50 CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 99.
51 See id. Some have commented that the exchange affected "hundreds of
thousands" who were uprooted from their homes. Eric Kolodner, Population
Transfer: The Effects of Settler Infusion Policies on a Host Population's Right to
Self-Determination, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 159, 164 (1994). Others have
stated that the figure of those displaced totaled over two million. Eric Rosand, The
Right to Return Under InternationalLaw Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia
Precedent?, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1091, 1115 (1998). Despite contrasting figures,
the exchange was a massive undertaking affecting an enormous number of displaced individuals. Additionally, one author has commented that "the compulsory
Turkish-Greek exchange of population in the 1920's [was] an effort whose central
thrust was not protection of minority rights." Carol Weisbrod, Minorities and Diversities: The "Remarkable Experiment" of the League of Nations, 8 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 359, 365. "Thus, [Thornberry] writes of the 1923 Greek-Turkish Convention that it is a 'notorious interwar example of a treaty exhibiting a reverse [nonprotective] tendency."' Id. (quoting PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES
52

CLOGG,

supra note 33, at 99.

51 (Clarendon Paperbacks 1991)).
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Turks' consenting to allow the Greek population to stay in the city.

'53

Ulti-

mately, faced with growing opposition from British and American representatives, the Turkish stance softened, and the Patriarchate was permitted
54
to maintain residency in its native home.
Although the Ecumenical Patriarchate is not described by name in
the text of Lausanne, it is implicitly referred to as a religious institution of
the Orthodox minority. 5 However, contrary to the spirit of Lausanne, the
desires of the international community, and the repeated pleas of the Patriarchate, Turkey has yet to commit to the abolishment of stifling state practices aimed at curtailing religious and personal freedoms. In support of this
position, this section will document the various discriminatory practices of
the Republic, some historical and other present, in relation to the Patriarchate and its minority community. The following section will consider
whether the Patriarchate should continue to rely primarily on the Treaty of
Lausanne and EU diplomacy as its primary methods of recourse for documented acts of state suppression.
A.

The Closing of the Theological School of Halki

Perhaps the most vital and necessary institution to the continued
56
existence of the Patriarchate is the Theological Seminary at Halki.
Halki's origins are traced to 1844, 57 when Patriarch Germanos IV officially
inaugurated its status while acting under authority granted by the Ottoman
government. The school began operations on October 1st of the same year.
The Seminary was to serve as the training and educational facility for the
Eastern Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate. 58 The Patriarchate, in particular, used the educational facility to train successors to the position of
supra note 46, at 75.

53

YILDIRIM,

54

See id. at 76.

See Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4, art. 42.
56 The school sits high atop the Hill of Hope on Halki Island in the Sea of Marmara. The Seminary's location is truly unique and rich in tradition. At the time of
Halki's inception, theological training was not new to the Island. Halki's predecessor, the Monastery of the Holy Trinity, sat in the very same location for well over
1,150 years prior thereto and is thought to have been founded by Photius I, Patriarch of Constantinople. For information regarding recent developments concerning
55

Halki, see generally
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(Human Rights Watch 1992).
See id. at 19.
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See id.
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Ecumenical Patriarch. 59 During the years of its operation, the school of
theology was an integral component of the Eastern Orthodox Church. In
fact, between 1844 and 1971, literally "hundreds of priests [were] trained at
the Halki academy ....-60 Additionally, Halki's importance and purpose
were never confined to serving merely the institutions of Istanbul. Rather, a
significant number of those educated at Halki prior to its closing were
trained to be placed in leadership positions spanning the globe, including
61
Africa, the United States, and Greece.
Despite the seminary's function as an integral institution of the Patriarchate, Turkey has taken multiple steps to divest the institution of the
ability to train its future leadership. In 1964, Turkey "demoted [Halki]
Then, in 1971, Turkey
from university status to a training school ....,,62
nationalized all non-Turkish, private institutions of higher learning by a decree from the Constitutional Court. 63 Turkey also charged Halki's "lay
board of trustees with mismanagement and anti-Turkish propaganda and
dismissed them." 64 These charges have been criticized outside of Turkey as
being arbitrary and meritless. 65 Turkey has also refused to permit the reopening of Halki, and, generally, has put forth very weak arguments in support of its position. Those arguments will be presented and their validity
challenged in Section Two of this article.
B.

Limitations Placed on the Leadership of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate

The legal status of non-Muslim religious institutions has been an
issue of serious dispute in Turkey since the Treaty of Lausanne.66 For instance, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has long been considered as the "first
among equals" in Eastern Orthodox Christianity outside of Turkey, and has
Steven Stavros Skenderis, The Ethnic Greeks of Turkey: The Present Situation
of the Greek Minority and Turkey's Human Rights Obligations Under International
Law, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 551, 579 (2004).
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 Prodromos Yannas, The Human Rights Condition of the Rum Orthodox, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY 67 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat ed., Univ. of Pa. Press
2007).
59

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

See H.R. Con. Res. 50, 104th Cong. (1995); see also H.R. Con. Res. 345, 107th

Cong. (2002).
66

Yannas, supra note 62, at 66.
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acted as the spiritual leader of a large segment of the global Orthodox community. 67 Additionally, it generally is recognized that the ecclesiastical influence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate currently extends "to Europe, North
and South America, Asia and Australia. '68 However, contrary to actual
practice, the Patriarchate has been declared by Turkish officials to be a
mere domestic "Turkish institution limited to serving the Rum Orthodox
minority in Istanbul." 69 As a matter of state policy, the government maintains that the Patriarchate is not ecumenical in nature, and has no authority
to exercise its ecclesiastical jurisdiction or influence regarding churches that
it has maintained close relations with since its inception, and which have
70
lasted for more than sixteen centuries.
In support of this state rhetoric, high-level Turkish officials have
gone so far as to declare that use of the term "ecumenical" when referring to
the Patriarch is a violation of the Treaty of Lausanne.71 This position is
largely unfounded, considering that the Treaty itself makes no direct reference to the ecumenicity of the Patriarchate, and instead deals with the rights
of minority citizens. 72 The only indicia of agreement between Greek and
Turkish representatives on this issue is taken from the minutes of the Lausanne negotiations, where the "Turkish delegation verbally acquiesced...
to the Greek demand that the Patriarchate remain in Istanbul on the condition that its authority would be solely confined to spiritual matters. '73 Admittedly, this position does enjoy some evidentiary support, as the Greek
67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

See Skenderis, supra note 59, at 576.

71

US DEP'T OF STATE, TURKEY: INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT

(2006) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2006)], availableat http://www.
state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71413.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). Despite this rhetoric, ecumenicity of the Patriarch is not addressed in the Treaty of Lausanne. See
Skenderis, supra note 59, at 552.
72 See Yannas, supra note 62, at 58.
73 Id. Turkey presumably interprets the Treaty as providing the Ecumenical Patriarchate with a "back-door" type of protection, if any. That is, by Lausanne's conferring and protecting the rights of the Orthodox minority in Turkey, the
Ecumenical Patriarchate obtains the right to provide spiritual service on its behalf
in Article 42. See Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4, art. 42. Therefore, in Turkey's view, if there comes a day when there is no Orthodox minority in Istanbul to
serve, the Ecumenical Patriarchate theoretically would have no legal right to exist
under the Treaty. This identifies an additional potential motivating factor on the
part of the Turkish government in the reduction of minority communities in Istanbul and the levying of restrictions on Patriarchal leadership. Simply, it furthers the
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representative, Eleftherios K. Venizelos, made verbal concessions in promising the Turkish delegation that the Patriarchate would remain in Constantinople "as a spiritual institution and deal only with ceremonial needs of the
74
Greek community.
However, commentators generally have failed to point out that
Greece, and other Lausanne signatories, may have lacked the requisite authority to make concessions regarding the international and ecumenical
character of the Patriarchate. This is due to the fact that the Orthodox
Church of Greece, formerly under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Patriarchate and a resident of the particular party, Greece, responsible for making verbal concessions regarding the Patriarchate, had unilaterally
disassociated itself from the Patriarchate prior to the negotiations of Lausanne.75 Therefore, without a sufficiently close nexus between the government of Greece and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, Turkey's presumed
reliance on Greek verbiage from Lausanne negotiations may not be well76
founded.
Ecumenicity aside, consistent with Turkey's apparent policy of opposition to Patriarchal existence in Istanbul, the government has imposed
severe legal restrictions that threaten the continued survival of the Patriarchate. Currently, the government requires that the leadership of the Patriarchate be of Turkish citizenship. 77 The state practice of limiting the
availability of future leadership has the effect-whether intentional or
78
not-of limiting the pool of candidates available to fill such positions.
state's public objective to rid Istanbul of the Patriarchate. See Yildirim, supra note
46, at 75.
74 Yildirim, supra note 46, at 76.
75 See generally Theofanis G. Stavrou, The Orthodox Church of Greece, in 1
CHRISTIANITY UNDER STRESS: EASTERN CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICS IN THE TWEN-

CENTURY 188 (Pedro Ramet ed., Duke Univ. Press 1988).
Admittedly, Greece did briefly exercise authority over the Patriarchate's territorial location, Constantinople, immediately prior to the negotiations of the Treaty of
Lausanne. However, at that time, the Patriarchal institution was already operating
ecumenically on an international scale, as it had for centuries. And, as previously
pointed out, the religious institution of the Greek state had already officially disassociated from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
Therefore, at the time of negotiations, the only relationship Greece shared with the
Patriarchate of Constantinople was its ancient Greek heritage and temporary control over its native city. As a result, this author seriously disputes the legitimacy of
Greece's verbal concessions made during Lausanne negotiations regarding the international and ecumenical nature of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
77 Skenderis, supra note 59.
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According to Church officials, as of October 2002, a mere twenty-five clergymen of Turkish citizenship, including the Patriarch, were available to
serve the Patriarchal institution. 79 Additionally, many of these individuals
were reportedly in their late 70's and 80's in the late 1990's.80
Turkey's closure of Halki and the additional state-imposed restrictions on leadership have left the Patriarchate with an insurmountable barrier; its only remaining option is to export Turkish citizens out of the
country to obtain theological training at foreign Orthodox Christian institutions with hopes that they may return to Istanbul to lead the institution.
With the Greek Orthodox community shrinking below 2,500 members, and
the Turkish population holding steady at 99% Muslim, the chances of this
occurring are increasingly faint.8 From a sheer numbers perspective, there
simply do not appear to be enough Orthodox Christians within Turkey to
maintain the Patriarchal institutions under the current policy of the
82
government.
Turkish authorities have responded to concerns and criticisms from
the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the international community by establishing, with the assistance of the Faculty of Divinity at the University of Istanbul, a Department of Christian Theology, intended to aid in the training of
the Orthodox leadership. 83 However, neither the Government nor the Patriarchate has made a commitment to such a program. The University of Istanbul has continually failed to announce curricula publicly or secure
scholarly experts for the Department, and the Ecumenical Patriarch insists
84
in the revitalization of its own training program for future leadership.
Dilek Kurban, Confronting Equality: The Need for Constitutional Protection of
Minoritieson Turkey's Path to the European Union, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV.
79

151, 174 n.110 (2003).
80 Amberin Zaman, Orthodox Crusadesfor Theological School in Turkey, L. A.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1997, available at http://articles.latimes.com/p/1997/oct/03/news/

mn-38824 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
81
Statistics derived from RELIGIOUs
82

See

83

Kucukcan, supra note 12, at 505.

(2006), supra note 71.
supra note 3, at 31.

FREEDOM REPORT

TURKEY 2005 PROGRESS REPORT,

See id. Turkey's suggestion that Patriarchal training should be obtained at the
University of Istanbul is similar to an Italian announcement declaring that all future
Papal training could only be obtained at the University of Bologna. The Ecumenical Patriarchate has balked at this offer for obvious reasons, concerned primarily
with the type of education future clergy would be able to obtain from a predominantly state-controlled university. See generally George Gilson, Vartholomeos De84

mands Equal Rights, ATHENS NEWS, Feb. 22, 2002, availableat http://www.athens

news.gr/athweb/nathens.print unique?e=C&f= 12950&m=A03&aa= 1&eidos=S
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Other DiscriminatoryMeasures

The shrinking of the Orthodox community is no coincidence. 85 The
government has repeatedly failed to react in a timely fashion on occasions
where civil violence has threatened minority populations. One early, but
extreme, example became known as the "Pogrom of 1955," when religious
minorities suffered extensive personal and real property damage, and even
loss of life. 86 Government involvement was later revealed at the trials of
Prime Minister Menders and Foreign Minister Zorlu in September of
87
1961.
More recent examples include bombing attacks in 1994, 1996, 2004
and 2005 on Patriarchal grounds, one of which left a priest severely injured.8 8 Additionally, Turkey has refused to respond to requests for investigations and protections in response to death threats made upon the
Ecumenical Patriarchate. 89 The Turkish Government has disassembled and
confiscated the Patriarchate's printing facilities, and has been known to refuse passports to prevent international travel of Orthodox leaders. 90 At least
one Turkish leader has "incited hatred and [made] accusations against the
Ecumenical Patriarch that have culminated in a widespread press campaign
against the Patriarchate's presence in Turkey." 9 '
Furthermore, Turkey has required that religious organizations maintain a minimum number of members in order to legitimize a claim to real
(last visited March 1, 2009). In response to the state's proposal, Patriarch
Bartholomeos has commented that the requisite "combination of theory and praxis
does not exist at a university faculty of theology ...[as] Liturgical [communal] life
in Orthodoxy plays a central and essential role." Id.
85 See generally Yannas, supra note 62 (arguing that the Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul is shrinking primarily due to violence from Turkish nationalists,
largely in response to the few concessions that have been made by Turkey on the
Cypriot issue).
86 See generally VRYONIS, supra note 18.
87 Yannas, supra note 62, at 62.
88 Id. at 66. See also Balaskas, supra note 22, at 149. Greek cemeteries have also
been subjected to numerous attacks. Id. "The government's failure to either prevent or condemn the violence gained the attention of the European Parliament,
which held an emergency debate during the week of September 16, 1993 concerning these mistreatments." Id. at 148. "The European Parliament adopted three resolutions in which it expressed concern . . . and declared that the Turkish
government must take measures to protect the Greek Orthodox community." Id.
89 Balaskas, supra note 22, at 149.
90 Id. at 146-47.
91 Id.at 149.
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property use for religious purposes. 92 Should any organization not sustain
the minimum required number of members, the government has insisted
that it will not be compelled to recognize land rights. 93 To complicate the
matter for minorities, the government has failed to communicate the specific criteria used to dictate loss of property rights. 94 Rather, the decision to
expropriate property is at the discretion of the General Directorate of Foundations (GDF), a state agency designed to deal with minority properties
within Turkey. As a result of the discriminatory work of the GDF, the real
property rights of minorities in Turkey continue to be in serious jeopardy
today. 95

SECTION TWO. ASSESSING THE STRATEGIES FOR
PRESERVATION EMPLOYED BY THE PATRIARCHATE:
THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE & EU DIPLOMACY

This section will present and discuss the two main preservation
strategies generally employed by the Patriarchate. These strategies have
traditionally consisted of public appeal to the rights afforded to minorities
in the Treaty of Lausanne, as well as a passive approach whereby hopes of
preservation have been tied to the success of EU diplomatic efforts. This
section will, therefore, address the continued viability of each of these two
methods, and will discuss the role of each in the future of the Patriarchate's
fight for religious freedom in Turkey. As will likely become clear throughout this section, until very recently, the Patriarch's strategy has largely been
overly passive, poorly planned in terms of long-term viability, and contingent on the success of third-party negotiations.
I. THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE (1923)
A.

Examination of the Relevant Provisions

Under the terms of Lausanne, Greek Orthodox Christians, Jews,
and Armenian Christians are observed as officially legally protected "minorities," while Baha'is, Syrian Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Bulga92

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
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DEP'T OF STATE,

2007, available at http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90204.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT
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rian, Georgian and Maronite Christians, amongst others, are not. 96
Lausanne mandates that all protected minorities be afforded complete civil,
political, and legal equality. 97 The following section will not only introduce
the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne and examine whether Turkey's mistreatment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is a violation of the
treaty, but will also query whether litigation in accordance with its provisions is a viable solution for the Patriarchate's short-term needs.
(i) Article 37
Of foremost importance, Article 37 of the Treaty of Lausanne declares that the cumulative rights as memorialized in the successive sections
are "fundamental" in nature. 98 Turkey, as a signatory, has expressly agreed
that "no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere
with these [latter] stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official
action prevail over them." 99 Therefore, in the event conflict exists between
the rights protected by the Treaty of Lausanne and domestic Turkish law,
the fundamental rights memorialized in the Treaty should be applied as superseding national law to the contrary.
(ii)

Article 40: Right of Operation of Religious Institutions

Article 40 is the first of two provisions integral to the support of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate's cause under the Treaty of Lausanne. Article 40
expressly declares that non-Muslim minorities "have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious
and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction
and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their
own religion freely therein."' 0 0 Therefore, if the government has refused
96

See generally Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4, pt. 1, § III. See also Kucuk-

can, supra note 12, at 503.
97 See generally Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4, pt. 1, § III.
98 "Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be
recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action
shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor
official action prevail over them." Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4, art. 37.
99

Id.

10o Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4, art. 40. The issue of Halki "remains an open
sore in Turkey's international relations, despite the clear right of the Church to
'establish, manage, and control' such a school as is spelled out in Article 40 and
the primacy of Lausanne Treaty rights over national education laws as affirmed in
Article 37." David L. Arnett, The Importance of Emotion in Turkish-American
Relations, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Mar. 17, 2007, available at http://arama.huffiyet.
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the Orthodox minority permission to maintain a religious school free of
state control and intrusion, then it has acted in violation of its international
legal obligations.
A brief reconsideration of the mistreatment presented in Section
One, § III, supra, indicates that Turkey has in fact engaged in repeated and
ongoing acts which clearly constitute violations of Article 40. First, the
government closed the doors of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's only remaining school of theology, Halki.' 0 l Additionally, the General Authority for
Public Institutions, an agency of the government, has employed proceedings
aimed at harassing the Ecumenical Patriarchate by dismissing the Seminary's Board of Trustees, an action which the US House of Representatives
declared was done "arbitrarily."' 0 2 Third, the General Directorate of Foundations continues to place arbitrary restrictions on minority property use
and ownership, including the state's prohibition of renovation and expansion of places of worship. 03 Fourth, Turkey has implemented a steadfast
state policy aimed at curtailing the international community's recognition of
the Patriarchate's ecumenical nature. 1°4 By doing so, Turkey has unilatercom.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-601838 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). "Nevertheless, any
resolution of the Halki issues and other matters concerning religious minorities
appears to lie in the indefinite future, as nationalist emotion and xenophobia stemming from the [T]reaty of Sevres prevent consideration of just solutions by the
[Turkish] government." Id. "In short, the honored Treaty of Lausanne, which is
referred to constantly and emotionally in Turkey as the sacred foundation of the
modem Republic, imposes societal obligations on the state that have simply not
been met." Id.
'01 See supra Section One, § III (A).
102 See H.R. Con. Res. 345, 107th Cong. (2002). See also Yannas, supra note 62.
103 See infra Section Three, § IV. In response to these restrictions, the Orthodox
community recently was forced to file an appeal with the European Court of
Human Rights regarding an October 21, 2004 decision of Turkey's Supreme Court,
which ruled that the Church was not the rightful owner of the historic orphanage at
Buyukada. See Yannas, supra note 62, at 68. This case and its resolution on appeal to the European Court of Human Rights will be a focus of discussion in Section Three, § IV of this article, infra. To the credit of the state, reforms have been
implemented in recent years to lessen the severity of these restrictions as Turkey
attempts to align more closely with the European Union's admission requirements.
See Yannas, supra note 62, at 66, 68. However, even today, some of the work of
the General Directorate of Foundations remains discriminatory in nature. See
Kucukcan, supra note 12, at 504.
"4See Yannas, supra note 62, at 66. "As the global reach and recognition of the
Patriarchate increases, the official position has become more pronounced." Id.
Turkish officials have publically condemned the use of the word ecumenical in
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ally decided on behalf of the world's Orthodox community
worldly religious institutions may be considered ecumenical
Cumulatively, this governmental conduct is clearly contrary
promise of religious freedom, and provides strong evidence
and ongoing violations of Turkey's legal obligations expressly
ticle 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne.
(iii)

which of its
in nature. 105
to Turkey's
of historical
stated in Ar-

Article 42: Protection of Religious Establishments

Article 42 affords additional protections to the religious minorities
of Turkey. It states:
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities.
All facilities and authorisationwill be granted to the pious
foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions
of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the
Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of
new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessaryfacilities which are guaranteedto other private institu06
tions of that nature.1
An ordinary reading of the terms of Article 42 suggests that Turkey has an
affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to protect the establishments of the
minorities. However, various actions of the Turkish government provide
evidence of systemic and purposeful violations of the terms of Article 42.
Perhaps the most publicized and well-documented event occurred in 1955,
on the night and early morning of September 6-7. On the dates in question,
Istanbul's minority communities, composed predominately of members of
the Jewish and Christian faith, were essentially destroyed within a few
hours. 10 7 The attack, launched by an extensive collection of Turks and ralrelation to the Patriarchate, and have boycotted an event hosted by a US Ambassador due to his referral to the Patriarch as ecumenical in an official letter. Id.
I05 Turkey's ongoing interest in portraying the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a mere
domestic institution is in many ways puzzling. As a religious institution, the issue
regarding the ecumenical nature of a particular Church should generally be a purely
internal, institutional matter, not one to be decided at the hands of the Turkish
government. See Niyazi Oktem, Religion in Turkey, 2002 BYU L. REV. 371, 377
(2002).
106 Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4, art. 42.
107 See generally VRYONIS, supra note 18, at 99-188. See also Balaskas, supra
note 22, at 145. "[S]ixty out of the eighty Orthodox Churches in the city were
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lied by anti-minority and nationalistic sentiments, was suspected by many
to be an effort by the Turkish Government to drive Turkey's minorities out
of Istanbul. One work, dedicated largely to the events transpiring in 1955,
notes:
The refusal, save on very rare occasions, ofpolice and soldiery to intervene [was] also characteristically uniform.
Not only did the authorities encourage and often assist the
pogromists, but they frequently aided and abetted the looting, thus committing the actual crimes they had been sworn
to prevent. In addition to the uniformity of planning and
destruction throughout greater Istanbul, the weapons and
implements of destruction issued by the demonstratorswere
also uniform. Many of the slogans and curses reveal an
attitude of people who readily desire the physical and psychological destruction of their victims. This furor was
chauvinistic, religious, fanatical, vandalistic, and
voracious. Worst of all, it represented a massive and wellorganized official attack on Greek Istanbulis in which the
organs of government directed and oversaw the violence
against its own citizens.108
With confirmation coming later that the "Pogrom of 1955" was in
fact accomplished with direct involvement from high-ranking government
officials, 0 9 it became clear that Turkey had not merely failed to protect
established institutions and minorities as promised under Article 42, but had
even taken affirmative steps to destroy a minority community. Additional
and more recent examples of systematic failure to protect religious minorities' establishments, as discussed in Section One, § III (C), supra, include
vandalism and bombings of Church properties and cemeteries.
B.

Issues Regarding Litigation under the Treaty of Lausanne

From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Orthodox minority community have suffered, and
continue to suffer, grave injuries at the hands of the state. However, there
is, of course, a very real difference between a conveyance of rights and an
sacked or gutted and incalculable damage was done to Christian property, with
widespread raping and some loss of life. For several hours the Turkish authorities
did little to intervene, allowing the rioters a virtually free hand." Id.
108 VRYONIS, supra note 18, at 186.
109 See YANNAS, supra note 62, at 62.
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ability to enforce them. Therefore, it is not enough merely to demonstrate
that Turkey has in fact violated international legal obligations under Lausanne. Rather, to be of any practical value to the Patriarchate's predicament
in the short-term, the rights of the Patriarchate must be equipped with an
enforcement mechanism. Regarding this issue, there remain two preliminary matters that must be resolved in order to determine the viability of a
claim brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). To this end,
the following section will consider whether the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear
such a proposed claim under Lausanne and, if so, whether the Patriarchate
has legal standing to initiate a complaint on its own behalf.
(i) Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in this Case
(a)

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The subject matter jurisdiction concern stems from the fact that the
Treaty of Lausanne was entered into under the authority of the League of
Nations, prior to the assembly of the United Nations (UN) and the ICJ." 0
Under the auspices of the League of Nations, Turkey agreed that the obligations set forth by Lausanne were of international concern, and expressly
agreed to have alleged infractions and questions of law or fact reviewed by
the signatory powers to the Council, which included Great Britain, Japan,
Italy, and France.'
Turkey further agreed that upon the recommendation
of those nations, the former League Council members, the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ) would have jurisdiction to enter a final deci12
sion on the alleged infraction.'
The question, therefore, becomes whether the ICJ could exercise
subject matter jurisdiction if such a claim were to be brought by the Patriarchate when the PCIJ no longer exists. With the issues of Patriarchal
standing and PCIJ adjudicatory jurisdiction set aside for the time being, this
question must be answered in the affirmative for the following reasons.
First, Turkey, Greece, and the other signatories to the Treaty have an interest in the enforcement of the provisions of the agreement, and each is currently a UN member state.' 13 Second, Article 92 of the UN Charter states
110

See generally Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4.

"'l

Id. art. 44.

112 Id.

For a current list of member states, see http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml
(last visited Mar. 1, 2009). Turkey was admitted as a UN member on October 24,
1945, and Greece on October 25, 1945. Id. Although Article 102 of the U.N.
Charter requires all agreements to be submitted and recorded with the Secretariat in
order to be enforceable in the International Court of Justice, this requirement only
113
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that the ICJ is the principal judiciary body of the UN, and that the Statute of
the PCIJ (of the League of Nations), "forms an integral part of the present
Charter."'1"4 Additionally, Article 93 expressly states that "[a]ll Members of
the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. 11 5 Last, the Assembly of the League of Nations, in the
adoption of its last resolution on April 18, 1946, provided for the transfer,
to the UN, of all rights and obligations which were attributed to the League
of Nations in treaties. 1 6 Therefore, the Treaty of Lausanne, although entered into and preserved under the authority of the PCIJ, is appropriate subject matter for ICJ proceedings.
(b)

Adjudicative Jurisdiction

However, for the ICJ to exercise jurisdiction, it must have adjudicative jurisdiction as well as subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to adjudicate in ICJ disputes is generally secured by consent of the parties."l 7 This
customarily occurs in one of three ways. First, the parties may submit the
dispute to the ICJ by special agreement. Second, the parties may submit to
jurisdiction under a dispute settlement clause written into the agreement,
commonly referred to as a "compromissory clause". Third, the parties may
submit to compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36(2) of the Statapplies if "entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present
Charter comes into force ..... " U.N. Charter, art. 102 (emphasis added). Therefore, a failure to register the Treaty of Lausanne with the Secretariat does not defeat
a potential legal application to the International Court of Justice to enforce the
provisions thereto.
114 U.N. Charter, art. 92. "The ICJ's Statute is substantially the same as the PCIJ's
Statute, and the ICJ has frequently referred to its predecessor's precedents."
BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (5th ed., Aspen Publishers
2007).
115 U.N. Charter, art. 93. As such, the ICJ acts as the main organ for transnational
dispute resolution amongst its members. In doing so, each member is compelled to
comply with any decision rendered by the ICJ. See U.N. Charter, art. 94, para. 1.
If compliance with the final order of the ICJ is refused, the party other than that
which is non-compliant may move for measures to be taken by the Security Council. U.N. Charter, art. 94, para. 2.
116

See

BENEDETrO CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

6-7 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005). See also Hugo J. Hahn, Continuity in the
Law of InternationalOrganization. 3 DUKE L.J. 379-422 (1962).
117 CARTER, supra note 114, at 301.
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ute of the ICJ. 118 In this case, Article 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne divests
adjudicative jurisdiction in the ICJ by way of a compromissory clause in all
situations regarding questions of law, fact, or danger of infraction in relation to non-Muslim minorities. 1 9 Therefore, the ICJ would theoretically
have adjudicative jurisdiction contingent on the appropriate party petitioning the Court.
(ii)

Standing of the Patriarchate

Although the ICJ could entertain Such a suit on jurisdictional
grounds under an appropriate scenario, it is extremely unlikely that the Patriarchate would have standing to initiate a claim on its own behalf for the
following reasons. First, the Patriarchate would not meet the requirements
of standing found in the Statute of the ICJ. Article 34(1) provides that only
"States may be parties in cases before the Court.

' 120

Additionally, the Patri-

archate would very likely not meet what has been loosely referred to as an
"aboriginal minorities" rule, whereby a party may otherwise maintain the
requisite degree of sovereignty to bring its own claim under certain limitations. 21 Therefore, at this time, the Patriarchate almost certainly lacks the
118 Id. at 309. See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 39 AJIL Supp. 215 (1945) [hereinafter Statute of
ICJ].
119 See Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4, art. 44.
120 Statute of the ICJ, supra note 118, art. 34, para. 1. Additionally, Article 35(1)
states that the "Court is 'open to the parties to the [ICJ] statute,' namely, the 192
members of the United Nations." CARTER, supra note 114, at 300-01.
121 See Julie Cassidy, Enforcement of Aboriginal Rights in Customary International Law, 4 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 59, 89 (1993). "As only 'States' can
appear before the International Court of Justice, unless aboriginal minorities can
establish they are sovereign States, they cannot bring an action before this international body." Id. Perhaps mindful of the possibility of the Ecumenical Patriarchate
developing quasi-sovereignty, Turkey continually employs measures to reaffirm the
institution's status at every opportunity. For instance, "[w]hen the government first
heard of Pope Benedict's wish to visit Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomeos in Istanbul
they were alarmed." Dogu Ergil, Mamma Mia, the Pope is Coming!, TURKISH
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 27, 2006, available at (http://http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/
arsivnews.aspx?id=_594191) (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). Turkish alarm was twofold. First, Turkey feared that the Pope's visit might provide additional fuel for the
Patriarchate's bid for state recognized ecumenicity. Id. Second, the state was fearful that the visit from the Pope, without making arrangements through the Turkish
government first, might afford "de facto statehood to the Patriarchate because the
Pope is not only a religious community leader but also a head of state. To avoid
that possibility, the Turkish government extended an official invitation to the Pope,
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requisite standing to bring a claim under Lausanne before the ICJ.122 In-

stead, regarding the Treaty of Lausanne, the Patriarchate is left with little
more than hopes for third-party state intervention.
C.

Examining the Viability of Recourse under the Treaty of Lausanne

Based on the foregoing analysis, the initiation of litigation under
the Treaty of Lausanne is unattractive for at least three reasons. For one, it
is very unlikely that the Patriarchate would possess standing, as it lacks
statehood and otherwise sufficient indicia of sovereignty. Additionally, although an interested Lausanne signatory (presumably Greece) could theoretically petition the ICJ on behalf of minorities and religious institutions
burdened by Turkish mistreatment, none have taken the initiative nor expressed any willingness to do so in the near future. Last, there appears to be
a better-suited, alternative adjudicative forum readily available in Stras123
bourg: the ECHR.

II.
A.

DIPLOMACY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Politics of European Integration & the Copenhagen Criteria

Despite a lack of enforcement of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey's
mistreatment and disregard for its international legal obligations regarding
the well-being of its minority populations and religious institutions have not
gone unnoticed amongst its peers. The EU, of which Turkey has sought
membership for decades, continues to express concern regarding the docu124
mented human rights violations that continue to occur within Turkey.
The status of the Patriarchate and its crusade to obtain religious freedom
within Turkey have been of particular focus. In fact, the Patriarchate's bid
to reopen the theological school of Halki has often been referred to as the
25
"litmus test" for Turkish accession into the EU.1
obliging him to be the Turkish state's visitor rather than that of the head of a dependent institution." Id.
122 However, there are arguments to be made regarding the Patriarchate's international legal personality. See generally Balaskas, supra note 22 (commenting on the
international and ecumenical character of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of

Constantinople).
The viability of litigation in the European Court of Human Rights will be thoroughly discussed in the latter part of this article. See infra Section Three.
124 See generally TURKEY 2005 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-39.
125 Seminary Stays Shut as Turkey Bucks EU Pressure,TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Oct.
10, 2006 [hereinafter Seminary Stays Shut], available at http://arama.hurriyet.
com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-590528 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009); Turkey Rules Out
123
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The approach of the EU has traditionally been to encourage broad
reform without the use of invasive or aggressive tactics; typically, the benefits of EU membership create the incentive for change. To clarify and further its expansionistic ambitions, the EU has established specific criteria
against which all candidate states will be judged, generally referred to as the
Copenhagen Criteria. 126 In the past, many states have been willing to reform a variety of domestic policies in order to meet the EU's requirements
for membership. 27 At times, Turkey has appeared similarly interested in
meeting these standards. However, the government continues to fall short
of compliance with EU membership standards due to a lack of commitment
to certain human rights principles, as evidenced by Halki's continued clos28
ing and the Turkish government's mistreatment of minority populations.
Additionally, the EU is extremely concerned with the Turkish government's
129
mishandling of the Cypriot issue.
Reopening of Greek Seminary, Report Says, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, May 3, 2006
[hereinafter Turkey Rules Out Reopening], available at or http://arama.hurriyet.
com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-590528 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
126 See Francis G. Jacobs, The State of InternationalEconomic Law: Re-Thinking
Sovereignty in Europe, 11 J. INT'L EcON. L. 5, 35-36 (Mar. 2008). See also http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/indexen.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter EU Enlargement Policy].
127 See generally Nevena Simidjiyska, From Milosevic's Reign to the European
Union: Serbia and Montenegro's Stabilization and Association Agreement, 21
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 147 (2007) (discussing policy reformations in Serbia
and Montenegro in pursuit of EU accession).
128 See generally TURKEY 2005 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 3. See also Seminary Stays Shut, supra note 125; Turkey Rules Out Reopening, supra note 125.
129 In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus with the stated objective of restoring constitutional order. See Marios L. Evriviades, The Legal Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 227, 262 (1975). However, over 30 years later, Turkey
maintains a military presence in Cyprus. Despite numerous demands from the UN
Security Council to vacate, as well as demands from the sovereign state of Cyprus,
Turkey has continued to defy the international community by establishing a "puppet-government" in the north, known as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(the "TRNC"). See Suzanne Palmer, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus:
Should the United States Recognize It as an Independent State?, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J.
423, 442-44 (1986); see also S.C. Res. 541, U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 2500 mtg. at
15016, U.N. Doc. S/INF/39 (Nov. 18, 1983); S.C. Res. 550, U.N. SCOR, 39th
Sess., 2539th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/40 (May 11, 1984). Turkey is the only
nation in the world that maintains Turkish occupation is legal, and that recognizes
the sovereignty and/or existence of the TRNC. See Palmer, supra. See also S.C.
Res. 550, U.N. SCOR, 39th Sess., 2539th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/INF/40 (May 11,
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All European candidate states are subject to the criteria established
by the Copenhagen Council in 1993 and reaffirmed by the Madrid European Council in 1995.130 Every nation seeking membership must conform
to the conditions set out by Article 49 and the principles embodied in Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union.13 ' As always, a priority of the
Council remains the observance and protection of fundamental human
rights and religious freedom by prospective candidate states. For accession,
new member states must meet three criteria. These criteria include: (i) a
political element, including guarantees of democracy and the rule of law,
human rights, and respect and protection for minorities; (ii) an economic
element, whereby a functioning and regionally competitive market economy is established; and (iii) acceptance of, and the ability to assume, membership obligations, including adherence to the aims of a political,
economic and monetary union. 132 All criteria must be satisfied before the
European Council will open full negotiations. 133 Human rights and religious freedom concerns, such as the closing of Halki, fall within the first
requirement, hereinafter referred to as "political criteria."
To gauge a candidate state's progress, and to help implement a
framework for success, the European Commission publishes an annual progress report regarding each applicant, which provides detailed insight into
1984) (whereby the U.N. Security Council called on all states to refuse to recognize
or participate in the endeavors of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."). EU
members have cautioned that "Turkey will have to recognize the state of Cyprus
before it is admitted to the EU." Anthony Browne and Charles Bremner, Blair is a
Bad President, Say Critics, TIMES (UK), Sept. 22, 1995, available at http://www.

timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article569281.ece (last visited Mar. 1,
2009). In addition to Turkey's human rights issues, EU states cite Turkey's booming population, poverty, and questions regarding its "cultural compatibility" with
Europe as concerns regarding admission. See Jan Repa, Analysis: EU Views on
Turkish Bid, BBC NEWS, Sept. 30, 1999, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/4298408.stm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). See also Simidjiyska, supra note
127, at 154 (commenting on the EU being hesitant to admit states "large enough in
population and distinctive enough from current members to alter the identity of the
EU and to threaten its cultural heterogeneity").
130 See EU Enlargement Policy, supra note 126.
131

Id. See also Ilhan Yildiz, Minority Rights in Turkey, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 791,

808 n.118 (2007).
132 See EU Enlargement Policy, supra note 126. See also Katherine Krause, European Union Directives and Poland:A Case Study, 27 U. PA. 1. INT'L ECON. L. 155,
158 (commenting on the particular requirements for EU admission).
133 For an account of the Copenhagen Criteria, see http://europa.eu/scadplus/
glossary/accession criteriascopenhaguesen.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
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the prospective state's satisfaction of the Copenhagen Criteria. In the European Commission's 2005 Progress Report regarding Turkey, the Commission acknowledged Turkish improvement in a variety of areas, including
political criteria. However, the Commission noted that reform had not been
implemented to a satisfactory degree, and that progress had not occurred
quickly enough. 13 4 In short, Turkish reform has traveled quite a distance
since serious talks began, but still has a very long way to go in the eyes of
many of Turkey's Western allies.
B.

Should the PatriarchateContinue to Rely Primarily on Diplomacy?

Without question, EU diplomacy has achieved real and measurable
results within Turkey.135 However, despite areas of improvement, there is
undoubtedly much more ground left to cover, and there are reasons to be
extremely skeptical of the short-term viability of relying primarily on diplomatic solutions. First, although historically quite effective, EU diplomacy
is a slow-moving creature with an eye for long-term change. Thus, the
threshold question in this case is whether the Patriarchate, in consideration
of its aged leadership, can sustain itself under the current state of Turkish
law until reforms are truly achieved. 13 6 To make sustenance viable solely
under the diplomatic method, Turkey would have to repeal the decision of
the Constitutional Court and reopen Halki (or a similar training institution)
and/or lift the harsh legal restrictions placed on the leadership of the Patriarchate, all within a matter of years. 137 Although Turkey has flirted with the
prospects of opening the training institute of the Patriarchate at times, the
See generally TURKEY 2005

PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 3.
For instance, unlike in 1972, Turkey refrained from interfering with the Patriarchal election of 1990. Yannas, supra note 62, at 66. The government also has
ceased the imposition of certain stifling bureaucratic procedures in order to allow
the repair of some religious and charitable facilities. Id. Within recent years Turkey temporarily introduced a liberal reform package which would have allowed
foreign students to study at schools run by ethnic minorities. This was viewed by
some to be an implicit affirmation that Halki might soon reopen. However, this
action was quickly reversed when internal opposition became too great. After reversing its short-lived policy, the government quickly reassured critics that "the
government [had] no such plans [to reopen Halki]." Seminary Stays Shut, supra
note 125.
136 See supra notes 78 and 79 and accompanying text.
137 On the detrimental effects of Halki's closure and the restrictions placed upon
the Patriarchate leadership, see generally supra Section One, § III (A) - (B). Also,
the EU has noted that, without significant change in Turkish domestic policies,
minority communities will experience great difficulties in maintaining their com134
135
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reality is that it has still failed to do so and refuses to provide any definitive
answer as to whether it may at any time in the future. 138 Additionally, for
every statement released by the state providing reasons for optimism, there
exists contrasting rhetoric that suggests the state may never open the

institute. 139
Second, to further complicate diplomatic efforts, there is no guarantee that Turkey will maintain the internal momentum necessary to join the
EU in a timely fashion. In fact, sources from within Turkey suggest that the
population has become increasingly annoyed with the process of European
integration, and that the government has witnessed a stark shift in the court
of public opinion. 140 A significant number of Turkish citizens appear to be
munities beyond the current generation. TURKEY 2005 PROGRESS REPORT, supra
note 3.
138 "The AKP [, the conservative, pro-Western, ruling Turkish political party,] has
openly told church officials that it is in favor of opening the Halki School and it is a
known fact that the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomeos has good relations
with the government." Mehmet Ali Birand, Turkey under Watch . . . , TURKISH
DAILY NEWS,

Jan. 22, 2008, available at http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.

aspx?id=-622653. Additionally, "Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said his government viewed it as normal that non-Muslims in Turkey [would] educate their own
clerics and that according to Turkish tradition, there [had] always been freedom in
that area." Sinem Tasseven, Hatemi: Opening Halki Seminary will bring Peace,
TURKISH DAILY NEWS, July 4, 2004, available at http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/
arsivnews.aspx?id=-531398. In October 2005, the Minister of Education stated that
he was opposed to the continued closure of the Seminary. TURKEY 2005 PROGRESS
REPORT, supra note 3. However, despite this rhetoric, as well as pleas from the
Patriarchate and international community, nothing has been implemented by the
Turkish government to effect the reopening for well over 35 years.
139 See generally Turkey Rules Out Reopening, supra note 125.
140

Orhan Kilercioglu, What Mr. Barroso Notes, TURKISH

DAILY NEWS,

April 17,

2008, available at http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-628136 (last
visited Mar. 1, 2009). See also Turkey Must Continue Reform Process, Says British

Minister, TURKISH

DAILY NEWS,

April 2, 2008, available at http://arama.hurriyet.

com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-627203 (commenting on general loss of enthusiasm
amongst Turks regarding accession talks with the EU due to anti-Turkish sentiments in Europe). The movement counter to EU accession has reportedly gained
momentum in Turkey, as many Turks appear to believe the repeated rejecting of
the EU is more about a clash between Islam and Christianity than human rights and
domestic policy. See generally A Survey on the European Union: The Ins and

Outs, 73

THE

ECONOMIST,

Mar. 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4913564.

This shift in public policy could be disastrous, as a further rift in Western and
Turkish relations "would surely put an end to any hopes of settling the Cyprus
problem. Worst of all, many Muslims would see a failure of Turkey's membership
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growing tired of the long, drawn-out transition toward Europeanism, and
the constant barrage of comments coming from EU members only works to
remind Turks of a historically unfriendly past with their European
neighbors. 141
As a result of these political uncertainties, it is the opinion of this
author that the Patriarchate should not remain idle while awaiting implementation of EU reforms that may prove to be too little too late. Such has
largely been the failed strategy of decades past, and the predicament now
facing the Patriarchate is in part a direct effect of the Patriarchate's own
passivity and near-sightedness. Instead, the Patriarchate should pursue
other avenues for realizing short-term reform in the interim, as outlined
below, while continuing to encourage EU diplomacy as a part of its longterm strategy for sustenance.

SECTION THREE. DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
FOR INSTITUTIONAL PRESERVATION IN TURKEY:
SUPRANATIONAL LITIGATION

hopes as a rebuff administered by a Christian club." Id. "Not only would that
further sour the West's relations with the Islamic world; it would also cause disaffection among the EU's own 15 million strong Muslim population, many of whom
are already hostile to the countries they live in." Id. See also Gulsen, supra note 2,
at 16 (stating that [in response to EU criticisms] "Islamic circles in Turkey welcomed this slap in the Turkish government's face, happily reasserting that the EU
was a Christian club, while pro-modernisation quarters regarded it as an incentive
for further democratisation."). Author Heinz Kramer notes that, to counter this
trend in public perception, and "[t]o improve the chances for such political engagement, Americans and Europeans should continue to explain to the Turkish political
leadership and public that American and European concerns are not foreign interference in Turkey's sovereign domestic affairs but normal political conduct among
allies." Heinz Kramer, A CHANGING TURKEY: THE CHALLENGE TO EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES 237 (Brookings Institution Press 2000). In effect, a failure of
EU diplomacy has been that Turkey often feels it is being forced to make concessions in state interests for the sake of becoming more European. See Turkey Must
Continue Reform Process, Says British Minister, supra.
141 See What Mr. Barroso Notes, supra note 140.
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I.

CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL

FREEDOMS

The third method of recourse available to the Patriarchate is under
the protection of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter "European Convention"),
which entered into force in September 1953.142 The ECHR, the adjudicative body of the European Convention, was launched in 1959 as an enforcement mechanism regarding obligations of member states. 143 Although
Turkey became a member of the European Convention in 1954, it was not
until 1989 that the government officially agreed to the binding jurisdiction
of the ECHR. 144 Thereafter, Turkey has been considered a "full participant
45
in the European regime."'
The ECHR has been touted as the "'most effective and advanced'
human rights regime in the world .... ,,146 As such, it has been noted that
the consistency of compliance with ECHR judgments is at such a high level
that it is generally viewed as being as capable of delivering justice as any
domestic court. 147 Due to its effectiveness and popularity, the court's case
load has steadily increased during its relatively short existence. In 2007,
the Court had 41,700 applications filed before a decisional body, an increase from just 27,200 in 2003.148
Turkey has played a significant role in the development of international legal norms through the adjudication of claims before the ECHR:
(2007)
[hereinafter ECHR, SURVEY], available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/
D0122525-0D26-4E21-B9D4-43AEAOE7A 1F5/0/SurveyofActivities2007.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2009). It is important to keep in mind that the function of the
European Convention and the ECHR are separate and apart from the European
Union, although compliance with rulings of the ECHR has been established as a
pre-condition for Turkey's accession into the EU. See Thomas W. Smith, Leverag142

See

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES

1

ing Norms: The ECHR and Turkey's Human Rights Reforms, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
TURKEY 263 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 2007).
143 See ECHR, SURVEY, supra note 142.
144 Smith, supra note 142, at 262.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 263 (quoting ANDREW Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
IN DOMESTIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 3 (Clarendon Press
1983)).
147 See Smith, supra note 142 (quoting Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.
J. 273, 283 (1997)).
148 ECHR, Survey, supra note 142, at 3.
CONVENTION
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approximately 12% of the 80,000 cumulative applications pending before
the Court in 2007 concerned the Turkish government. 149 Additionally, in
that same year, of the 1,503 judgments handed down by the ECHR, the
highest number concerned Turkey (331).150 As is apparent by the numbers,
the ECHR has had the opportunity to become quite familiar with Turkish
15 1
law and domestic policy over the course of nearly two decades.
II.

REGAINING THE PATRIARCHATE'S RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS
PRACTICE AND TEACHING

A.

Relevant Substantive Provision of Protection:Article 9

The substantive terms of the European Convention touch on a wide
range of human rights issues relevant to the mistreatment of the Patriarchate
in Turkey, including freedom of religion, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. 152 In order to determine whether the Patriarchate might
have a case under the European Convention regarding the right of religious
teaching, particularly the right to reopen and operate Halki, it is first important to determine exactly what rights are afforded by the European Convention. This section will also address jurisdictional and standing issues to
determine whether the Patriarchate may proceed with enforcement measures on its own behalf, unlike under Lausanne.
Article 9 of the European Convention states: "Everyone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance."'153 Therefore, barring application of the exception of Article 9(2), it follows that the Patriarchate, as a party residing in a member state, shall enjoy the broad and
extensive rights associated with the religious teaching provision of Article
9(1). Article 9(2) places conditions on the preceding paragraph, stating that
rights conferred by Article 9(1) may be limited only so far as "prescribed by
Id.
Id.
151 Additionally, author Thomas W. Smith argues that ECHR has actually played a
very crucial role in the reformation of the Turkish legal system and domestic policy
over the years. See generally Smith, supra note 142.
152 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 9 - 11, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 005 [hereinafter European Convention]. However, Article 9 will be the primary focus of this article, as it appears to
be the strongest case for the Patriarchate.
153 European Convention, supra note 152, art. 9(1) (emphasis added).
149
150
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law," and only when necessary to protect "the interests of public safety...
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of rights and freedoms
of others. 154 Therefore, in determining the legality of Turkish domestic policy, one must first ask whether the closing of the educational institution at
Halki is tailored to fit the exception of Article 9(2). Restated, the issue
becomes whether the government's closing of Halki is "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public
order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others."' 155 The analysis employed by the ECHR regarding Article 9(2) has
156
been referred to as the "democratic necessity test".
(i) Turkish Rationale Under Article 9(2)
Turkey has made a limited number of public statements regarding
its rationale for maintaining Halki's inoperable status. The state's public
argument typically centers on state concern with creating an appearance of
preferential treatment on behalf of the Patriarchate and Greek minority
Christians in Turkey, as well as the need to keep extremist Islamic centers
closed. 157 Authorities maintain that the state is currently in a delicate and
difficult situation. The Government has chosen to participate in a "militaryinspired crackdown on radical Islam" and Turkish officials do not want to
158
create the appearance that Christians benefit from preferential treatment.
Turkish officials have expressed concern that, should the theological school of Halki be permitted to operate for purposes of training Orthodox clergy in Turkey, fundamentalist Islamic schools might seek the same
privilege. 59 Regarding the necessity of Halki to remain closed, one senior
Turkish official stated that "[t]he Islamists will say you are opening infidel
154

European Convention, supra note 152, art. 9(2).

Id.
Stefan Sottiaux & Gerhard Van der Schyff, Methods of InternationalHuman
Rights Adjudication: Towards a More StructuredDecision-Making Processfor the
European Court of Human Rights, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 132
(2008). See also Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 49
(1976) (introduction of the ECHR democratic necessity test); Olsson v. Sweden,
130 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 67 (1988) (modem application of democratic necessity
analysis).
157 See Yannas, supra note 62.
158 See Zaman, supra note 80. See also Turkey Rules Out Reopening, supra note
125.
159 See Halki Seminary Debate Heats Up, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Nov. 16, 2003,
available at http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-535187 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2009); Sinem Tasseven, Hatemi: Opening the Halki Seminary will Bring
155
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schools while you are banning ours[J" adding that, "[t]he government simply can't afford that kind of criticism now."' 160 Deputy Parliament Speaker
Sadik Yakut reaffirmed the government's position a few years later, bluntly
stating that "[a]s long as there are no faculties affiliated to Suleymaniye or
Sultanahmet Mosques, there won't be a seminary affiliated to the
Patriarchate." 161
(ii)

Viable Claim on the Merits?

Recently, authors have noted that "[t]he settled formulation of the
democratic necessity test runs as follows: '[T]he notion of necessity implies
that an interference [with a Convention guarantee] corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued.'"162 Certainly, as is the proclaimed inherent right of all sovereign states and as is permitted by Article 9(2), it is graciously conceded that
the Republic of Turkey enjoys the right to identify domestic threats and
take protective measures regarding the preservation of the state and the
safety of its people. Additionally, it is quite likely that the suppression of
extremist religious institutions will be classified as a legitimate state interest. Therefore, if faced with the likely threat of institutionalized Islamic
extremism, there does appear to be a "pressing social need" for the preven63
tion of such extremism in Turkey.
However, what does not logically flow from that premise is that
Turkey must mandate the closure of all private religious institutions of
higher learning in order to quell the activities of merely a few hypothetical
institutions with anti-secular, anti-state, and/or extremist ambitions. Rather,
even after the identification of a legitimate state goal, the Court will query
whether the interference with a guaranteed right is proportionate to that
aim. t64 Analysis under the proportionality prong has taken on a variety of
forms, ranging from a least-restrictive-means analysis to a balancing of
competing interests "with an emphasis on evaluating the acceptability of all
' 165
the proportions of a particular interference."
Peace,

TURKISH DAILY NEWS,

July 4, 2004, available at http://arama.hurriyet.

com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-531398 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
160 Zaman, supra note 80.
161

Halki Seminary Debate Heats Up, supra note 159.

Sottiaux, supra note 156 (citing Olsson v. Sweden, 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A)
67 (1988)).
163 See supra footnote 161 and accompanying text.
164 Sottiaux, supra note 156, at 132-3.
162

165

Id. at 133.
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In this particular matter, the state infringement of the European
Convention right to educate is likely to be determined disproportional regardless of the particular standard ultimately employed by the Court. First,
Turkish interference fails miserably under a least-restrictive-means form of
scrutiny. This is due to the fact that the otherwise legitimate objective of
the state could easily be accomplished by less restrictive measures. For
instance, if curtailing the operation of Islamic extremist institutions is the
proclaimed pressing social need, then Turkey could initiate the closure of
threatening institutions without affecting all private institutions of higher
learning, including those who pose no threat to the state.
Second, should the Court impose the more flexible balancing approach, as it has on occasion in the past, it is still doubtful that the overly
inclusive and broad policy of the state would adequately meet the proportionality requirement. Turkey has little to gain in terms of real safety by
initiating the closure of all private schools of higher learning when only a
very small fraction of those have been, hypothetically, identified as potentially dangerous. On the other hand, the Patriarchate literally stands to lose
everything, as its very existence depends in large part on its ability to educate future leadership.
In sum, it does not appear to be necessary to close both potentially
threatening and clearly non-threatening private educational institutions to
accomplish what might otherwise be a legitimate aim, and Turkey has
failed to advance any credible alternative argument in support of its actions. 16 6 Maintaining the inoperable status of Halki in order to suppress
radical Islam likely fails the element of "necessity" embodied in Article
9(2), and is therefore contrary to Turkey's international obligations under
the provision.1 67 As a result, it is likely that the Patriarchate would be sucAccording to press reports in November 2004, the theological school of Halki
was named by a Turkish National Political Document "as a threat to the internal
security of the country ..... Yannas, supra note 62, at 68. However, it remains
unclear on what grounds the report deemed Halki a state threat. Certainly it could
not have been considered a threat to physical security. As stated, the Patriarchate
has never publically been accused of engaging in activities detrimental to state
preservation. Should the Security Council of Turkey simply be opining as to a
mere threat to the cultural status quo, such a policy would clearly be deemed an
arbitrary and illegal discriminatory practice. It is, therefore, the opinion of this
author that such an allegation, without some substantiation provided by the Turkish
government, should not be considered credible. Rather, such "press leaks" are
more likely a political attempt to provide some foundational support to legitimize
an illegal state practice.
167 See European Convention, supra note 152, art. 9(2). "Freedom to manifest
one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are ... neces166
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cessful in initiating such a claim under Article 9 for the closure of Halki,
pending the resolution of preliminary procedural issues considered
below. 168
sary .... " Id. (emphasis added). As an alternative, Turkey might legitimately
adopt a measure whereby peaceful, law abiding religious institutions are permitted
to operate, while permission is denied solely to those embodying anti-state, antisecular, and/or extremist teachings. Adopting this method of addressing a potential
internal problem with radical Islamic extremism, should that be the government's
actual primary concern, would put Turkey in compliance with its international legal
obligations. In other words, such a policy would likely survive scrutiny under the
European Convention, as the defense of "necessity" is an exception to both the
freedom of religion provision of Article 9 and the prohibition of discrimination
provision of Article 14. See European Convention, supra note 152, arts. 9, 14.
Hypothetically speaking, should Turkey face a challenge in the ECHR regarding
this newly proposed policy, a necessity defense to radical Islamists' claim of discrimination would likely be well-founded (because, in the hypothetical, Turkey's
infringement of European Convention guarantees would likely be proportionalto
the actual pressing social need, unlike in the present case).
168 However, there is very real reason for concern, and the decision to litigate
should not be made in haste. Of particular concern is the fact that the ECHR has
historically pushed gently in cases dealing with Turkey's religious freedom disputes. As Smith points out, only once has the Court ruled that Turkey has violated
rights to religious freedom. See Smith, supra note 142, at 273. For instance, in
Tepeli et al v. Turkey, the Court denied the application of 41 former armed forces
members who claimed that they had been dismissed for purposes related to their
religious beliefs. Id. Additionally, the Court has upheld the Turkish domestic
court ruling regarding the dissolution and confiscation of property held by a political party that was suspected of undermining the secular order due to their efforts to
create a pluralistic system of Turkish and Quranic laws. Id. (citing Affaire Refah
Partisi (Parti de la Prosperite) et Autres c. Turquie, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98,
41343/98, 41344/98, paras. 58, 66 (2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=search&docid=42d268a24&skip=0&query=
partisi (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (holding that authorities acted reasonably in order
to protect Turkey's electoral system). However, the facts of the Refah case are
easily distinguishable from the facts of this case. In this case, the Patriarchate has
never advocated the substitution of any type of law in favor of national law. In a
more recent and well-known case, the government refused a Turkish citizen access
to Istanbul University on account of her wearing an Islamic head scarf. The ECHR
rendered a verdict for Turkey, holding that "'[a]rticle 9 does not protect every act
motivated or inspired by a religion or belief .... .' Smith, supra note 142, at 273
(quoting Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, para. 105 (2005), availableat http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48abd56ed.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009)).
Again, the facts of Sahin are in stark contrast to this case. In the Patriarchate's
case, mere acts motivated or inspired by religion are not at issue. Rather, the Patri-
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B.

Litigation Under the European Convention

(i)

Jurisdiction and Standing

As is evident from the discussion above, the ECHR would have
subject matter jurisdiction, as disputes involving member states' legal obli69
gations under the European Convention clearly fall within its purview.1
Likewise, the ECHR would enjoy adjudicative jurisdiction, as all member
states are bound to submit to the authority of the Court.170 Additionally,
Article 34 establishes that the Patriarchate would have standing to initiate a
claim on its own behalf' 71 Therefore, putting the exhaustion of remedies
principle aside for the time being, there would be no jurisdictional issues to
72
prohibit the initiation of the Patriarchate's case before the ECHR.1
(ii)

Addressing the Remaining Procedural Formalities

Despite having a meritorious claim, standing, and a forum to which
Turkey must answer, there remains one significant hurdle for the Patriarchate to clear prior to initiating litigation in the ECHR: the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies.1 73 Article 35 mandates that the Court only
archate's case concerns the performance of acts inherently necessary for the function, preservation and continuance of the institution itself. Therefore, although the
ECHR has taken a patient approach with Turkey in Article 9 cases in the past, the
Court has never had the opportunity to rule on a set of facts even remotely similar
to those present in the case proposed by this author.
169 See European Convention, supra note 152, art. 32. "The jurisdiction of the
Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the
Convention .... ."Id.
170 See ECHR, SURVEY, supra note 142, at 1. Jurisdiction for member states became mandatory with the adoption of Protocol No. 11 in November 1998. However, as noted earlier, Turkey agreed to accept binding jurisdiction prior thereto, in
1989. See Smith, supra note 142, at 262.
171 See European Convention, supra note 152, art. 34.
172 This proposition is supported by the ECHR entertaining jurisdiction in a recent
case brought by the Patriarchate against Turkey. See generally Fener Rum Patrikligi (Ecumenical Patriarchate) v. Turkey, App. No. 14340/05, Eur. Ct. HR. (2008)
(finding that Turkey violated the European Convention by revoking the Patriarchate's ownership of real property in Turkey), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp 197/view.asp?item= 1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=fener%20-%20
rum%20-%2014340/05&sessionid=22469643&skin=hudoc-en (last visited Mar.
1, 2009), English language abstract available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view. asp?item= 1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=fener-rum&sessionid=
22469718&skin=hudoc-pr-en (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
173 See European Convention, supra note 152, art. 35.
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hear matters after the petitioner has exhausted the remedies available to it
under the domestic courts of its home jurisdiction, and within six months of
the date of the final decision of the domestic courts. 174 As a result, for the
Patriarchate to try its case for the reopening of Halki before the ECHR, it
must first change its current mindset and exercise a degree of foresight in
developing a supranational litigation strategy by first lodging a complaint in
the courts of Turkey. 175 The Patriarchate has already passed up one potential opportunity to litigate the issue of ecumenicity, and this mistake could
76
prove costly considering the fragile condition of the institution. 1
C.

Step One: Reenlist Halki as the Patriarchate'sEducational
Institution

To pave its own road to Strasbourg, the Patriarchate should take
calculated steps to either resume institutional operations at Halki immediId.
175 See Orhan Kemal Cengiz, What Should the Ecumenical PatriarchateDo? (II),
TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Sept. 24, 2007, available at http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/
arsivnews.aspx?id=-615017 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (stating that, if the Patriarchate wants to achieve domestic rights in Turkey, one alternative is to change the
current mindset and bring domestic cases for each Turkish violation). This particular statement provided a great amount of inspiration for this portion of this article,
as well as for the need to develop an urgent and comprehensive litigation strategy
to accomplish the institutional needs of the Patriarchate.
176 See generally Orhan Kemal Cengiz, Is the Ecumenical Patriarchate Case
Ready to go to the European Court of Human Rights? (I), TURKISH DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 15, 2007, available at http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=614412 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). In a criminal case brought on June 26, 2007
against the Patriarchate in Turkey for the Patriarchate's dismissal of a Bulgarian
Church priest's tite of spirituality, a Turkish Higher Court of Appeals ("Yargitay")
took the opportunity to comment on the Patriarchate's ecumenicity (or lack
thereof), despite ruling in favor of the Patriarchate. DEP'T OF STATE, TURKEY:
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2007) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2007)], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90204.
htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). See also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TURKEY 2007
PROGRESS REPORT, COM (2007) 663 final (June 11, 2007) [hereinafter TURKEY
2007 PROGRESS REPORT], available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/keydocuments/2007/nov/turkey-progressreports-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
In doing so, the appellate court may have inadvertently opened the door for the
Patriarchate to appeal the decision within Turkey, and then to the ECHR. However, the Patriarchate once again delayed in adopting an aggressive approach, and
the six month time period for appeal under Article 35 elapsed prior to the start of
2008.
174
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ately, or to apply for an administrative order to have the Constitutional
Court's decree set aside. 177 This would present the government with a diplomatic dilemma, and force it to make a decision: will Turkey permit the
Patriarchate to defy Ankara's position on Halki, or will the government
instead choose to flex its muscle and take measures to ensure that the school
is not permitted to operate? If the Patriarchate implements this first proposal, the government is very likely to initiate proceedings against it premised
on the Constitutional Court decree of 1971, which is exactly what the Patri-

archate should desire. Alternatively, should the Patriarchate file for a request to abolish the decree of the Constitutional Court, only to have it
denied by governmental administrators, the Patriarchate will have created a
fresh "controversy" to take to the domestic courts. 178 With either route, the
Patriarchate wins.
After the initiation of proceedings, the Patriarchate will have to litigate through a series of decisions and appeals in the domestic courts. Depending on domestic law and the Turkish rules of appellate procedure, this
process could consume a significant amount of time and resources. However, some of the delays commonly associated with typical legal disputes
are not as great a concern in this matter, as the ultimate goal in this case is
not necessarily to "win" in the traditional legal sense, but rather to obtain
resolution in the form of a final ruling that satisfies the requirements of
Article 35 of the European Convention. Only then may the Patriarchate
appeal its case, regarding Article 9 rights, to the ECHR.
III. ALLEVIATING THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON
PATRIARCHAL LEADERSHIP

As previously discussed in Section One, § III, supra, Turkey has
taken steps to impose harsh limitations on the leadership of the Patriarchate. 179 These limitations include, primarily, governmental requirements that
See Orhan Kemal Cengiz, What Should the PatriarchateDo? (III), TURKISH
NEWS, Sept. 27, 2007, available at http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.
aspx?id=-615262 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). Of course, this process would have to
occur in compliance with Turkish national law to receive a final order on the
matter.
178 See id.
179 See Orhan Kemal Cengiz, What Should the Ecumenical PatriarchateDo? (II),
TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Sept. 24, 2007 available at http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/
arsivnews.aspx?id=-615017 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). The Patriarchate is limited
by "two declarations by the Istanbul governorate issued in 1923 and 1970, called
Talimat and Tezkere respectively." Id. "There is [otherwise] no law or regulation
.... " Id. This raises a separate interesting question, and possibly an alternative
177
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Patriarchal leadership be of Turkish citizenship. As previously discussed,
this has the damaging effect of limiting the pool of candidates available to
fill leadership positions, especially when combined with the impact of the
closing of Halki. 180 These restrictions nearly guarantee the long-term failure of Patriarchal sustenance, as the only remaining option is to export
Turkish citizens abroad to seek religious education and training in foreign
lands with hopes that they may return to lead the Patriarchate in the
future.I18
A.

Relevant Substantive Provision: Article 9

As a preliminary matter, the initiation of a claim by the Patriarchate
before the ECHR in response to these restrictions would obviously be subject to the jurisdictional and procedural analysis outlined prior hereto in
Section Three, § I, supra.182 Recall from the discussion in Section Three,
§ 11 (A), supra, that Article 9 of the European Convention guarantees certain rights, including the right to manifest one's religion free of governmental restrictions in worship, teaching, practice, or observance, apart from the
exception clause of Article 9(2).183 Restrictions imposed by the Turkish
Government work to limit the ability of Orthodox Christians to exercise
religion in accordance with the protections of the European Convention.
violation of Article 9(2), which requires that limitations on the free exercise of
religion be prescribedby law. See European Convention, supra note 152, art. 9(2).
Therefore, it is presently unclear whether the ECHR would consider this "declaration" a prescription by "law" for practical purposes (and subsequently find a violation of Article 9 rights), or if the Court would identify the failure to prescribe
limitations by law as the illegal activity in and of itself, without getting to the
question of whether Turkish policy violates Article 9 rights. What is more important, however, is that either way there appears to be a violation as a result of Turkey's practice. For a discussion regarding these declarations, see generally Cengiz,
supra note 177.
180 See generally supra Section One, § III (A).
181 See generally supra Section One, § III (B).
182 Rather than presenting a redundant recount of preliminary jurisdictional and
procedural matters, this section will incorporate by reference the analysis of supra
Section Three, § 11 (B). As a result, the Patriarchate would obviously be limited in
bringing this claim, first having to comply with the exhaustion of remedies principle of Art. 35 of the European Convention. See European Convention, supra note
152, art. 35. Moving forward, the remainder of this section will be dedicated to
discussing the merits of such a claim apart from procedural issues, and will also
examine Turkey's justification for its policies.
183 See European Convention, supra note 152, art. 9.
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This calls for a separate Article 9 analysis. As in the preceding analysis, to
determine the legitimacy of Turkey's state practice under Article 9 of the
European Convention, one must first ask whether Turkish policy is sufficiently tailored to withstand ECHR scrutiny under the democratic necessity
184
test of Article 9(2).

(i) Turkish Rationale Under Article 9(2)
Turkey generally has failed to provide a relevant national interest or
public order rationale in support of the aforementioned restrictive practices
placed upon Patriarchal leadership. Presumably, the Government's strategy
has essentially been to reassert that the Patriarchate exists in Turkey for one
purpose, to serve the Orthodox Christian minority. 185 On this point, Turkey
maintains that the Patriarchate enjoys no independent legal identity, and
that its rights are determined solely by national law. 186 That is, the Government's apparent position is that the Patriarchate is not entitled to the protections afforded by international agreements other than Lausanne. However,
as a preliminary matter, the aforementioned argument can be easily disposed of by making reference to recent ECHR case law. 8 7 Independent of
Article 9(2) concerns, Turkey's argument is flawed due to the fact that the
Patriarchate has already exercised legal rights apart from those which Turkey has "granted" to it, evidenced by the very recent ECHR judgment in
favor of the Patriarchate against the Turkish state. 188 Turkey's position regarding the Patriarchate's legal identity under the current supranational legal regime, therefore, is entirely devoid of merit.
See id.
185 See Cengiz, supra note 175. Turkey argues that although the Patriarchate's
legal status is not directly addressed in the Treaty of Lausanne, Greece acquiesced
in demands that the Patriarchate's function be limited to serving only the Orthodox
community of Istanbul. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
186 Cengiz, supra note 175.
187 See Fener Rum Patrikligi (Ecumenical Patriarchate) v. Turkey, App. No.
14340/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (finding that Turkey violated the European Conven184

tion by revoking the Patriarchate' s ownership of real property in Turkey), available
at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/view.asp?item= 1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=fener%20-%20rum%20---%2014340/05 &sessionid=22469643 &skin
=hudoc-en (last visited Mar. 1, 2009), English language abstract available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/view.asp?item= 1&portal=hbkm&action=html&

highlight=fener-rum&sessionid=22469718&skin=hudoc-pr-en (last visited Mar.
1, 2009). See also European Convention, supra note 152, art. 9.
188 See infra Section Three, § IV. See also Fener Rum Patrikligi (Ecumenical Patriarchate) v. Turkey, App. No. 14340/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
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Viable Claim on the Merits?

The claim for eliminating restrictions on Patriarchal leadership
under Article 9 is likely to succeed for at least two reasons. First, the Government's argument that the Patriarchate is not a potential participant under
the current supranational regime has been undisputedly discredited by the
recent holding of the ECHR, as well as the jurisdictional and standing analysis of Section Three, § II, supra. Second, for Turkish policy to survive
Article 9(2) scrutiny, the Court would need to be able to identify a pressing
social need to which the state has responded. In this particular scenario,
however, Turkey has categorically failed to provide any justification for the
necessity of such restrictions. This is quite possibly due to the fact that one
189
does not exist.
In sum, should Turkey fail to provide an adequate pressing social
need, as this author suspects it will, then the Court's Article 9(2) analysis
will conclude early. Only if Turkey is able to advance a coherent and legitimate argument on this point will the Court perform the analysis regarding
necessity and proportionality, as discussed above. 90 Given the present situation and the facts known at this time, it appears likely that the Patriarchate
will be successful in bringing the above-mentioned claim.
B.

Step Two: Continue the Appointment Procedures as Initiated in 2004

. Despite the restrictive policies currently in place, Turkey failed to
respond to the Patriarchate's appointment of six non-Turkish citizens to the
Holy Synod in 2004.191 The Patriarchate's move marked the first time in
Turkey's eighty year history that non-Turkish citizens served on the
body. 192 However, the Government has refused to repeal the measure that
prohibits non-Turkish citizens from serving in Patriarchal leadership roles,
and has not clearly acknowledged whether it intends to in the future.
Therefore, the legality of the Patriarchate' s 2004 act currently is in a state of
legal purgatory. On one hand, the Patriarchate appears to have violated
over eighty years of Turkish legal precedent while, on the other, it remains
unclear whether national law complies with its most basic, multilaterally
guaranteed rights.
189

Indeed, the task of conjuring such a pressing social need has proved difficult

for this author, even in the hypothetical (save furthering discriminatory state
policy).
190 See supra notes 163 - 164 and accompanying text.
191 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2007), supra note 176.
192 Id.
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Since the Government has left the state of this baseless and restrictive policy unclear, the Patriarchate's leadership should continue its fight to
obtain and preserve the function of its institutions by exercising the procedure of appointment of non-Turkish leadership whenever necessary for institutional preservation. In doing so, the Patriarchate may very well find its
way into Turkish courts yet again; however, just as with the fight for
Halki's reopening, this is exactly what the Patriarchate should desire.
Should Turkey initiate proceedings against it, the Patriarchate will be forced
to litigate all claims brought by the government through the national courts
first. Only after it receives a final domestic ruling may the Patriarchate file
an appeal with the ECHR to dispute the legality of Turkey's interference
with the appointment of religious leadership under Article 9.193 In response,
Turkey will either formulate a legally viable argument that can survive Article 9(2) scrutiny, which to date it has failed to do, or the Patriarchate will be
successful in initiating its claim.
IV.
A.

REGAINING CONTROL OF REAL PROPERTY

A New Era of SupranationalJurisprudence: The "Orphanage Case"

The control of real property in Turkey has been a sore subject for
the Patriarchate for many years prior to, and since the inception of, the
modern Republic. However, this misfortune may have taken a turn for the
better with the recent ruling of the ECHR in Fener Rum Patrikliai(Ecumenical Patriarchate)v. Turkey. 194 This case arose from a dispute regarding the ownership of real property, originally developed in the late

See supra Section Three, § II(B)(ii). Article 14 of the European Convention
may be an alternative claim before the ECHR due to Turkey's unequal application
193

of the law. See generally RELIGIOUs

FREEDOM REPORT

(2007), supra note 176.

Although Turkey has failed to respond formally to the Patriarchate's actions in
2004, the ban on non-Turkish citizens serving in religious institutions is still generally in effect. Id.
194 Fener Rum Patrikligi (Ecumenical Patriarchate) v. Turkey, App. No. 14340/05,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item
=1 &portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=fener%20-%20rum%20-%2014340/
05&sessionid=22469643&skin=hudoc-en (last visited Mar. 1, 2009), English language abstract available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=l
&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=fener-rum&sessionid=22469718&skin=
hudoc-pr-en (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
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nineteenth century as a hotel and tourist attraction. 95 Shortly after the completion of the project, the property was purchased by a wealthy Greek family in Istanbul and donated to the Ecumenical Patriarchate to be used as an
96
orphanage for Greek children.
In past years, the Turkish Government generally has acquiesced in
the operation of the charitable facility, and in Ottoman times even supported it.197 However, more recently, after the orphanage's operations
moved to a different location and changes in domestic law went into effect,
98
the Government began disputing the Patriarchate's claim of ownership.1
When the Patriarchate refused to budge on the issue, the dispute moved into
Turkey's domestic courts. After receiving a final unfavorable ruling on the
matter, the Patriarchate appealed its case to the ECHR in 2005, arguing that
the Turkish High Appellate Court had arbitrarily annulled its deed to otherwise rightfully held property. 199 Then, in December of 2007, the ECHR
overruled the Turkish courts, holding that the Government had violated the
property rights of the Patriarchate. As a result of the ECHR ruling, Turkey
was given the opportunity either to return the property or provide monetary
200
compensation.
B.

Step Three: Vigilant Enforcement of Real Property Rights

Although the "Orphanage Case" represents the Patriarchate's first
experience litigating in the supranational arena, it is not likely to be the last.
There are many questions that remain regarding the rights of minorities to
maintain property ownership in Turkey. For instance, the new Law on
Foundations, which would have clarified certain disputed areas of national
law, was vetoed by the President after being proposed by the Turkish ParSee Ariana Ferentinou, The Greek Orphanage in Prinkipo: A Case Against Turkey in Europe, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Nov. 26, 2007, available at http://arama.
hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-619169 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
196 Id
195

Id. "The sultan himself helped the cause of [the orphanage] by a generous gift
of 146 gold pieces." Id.
198 See id.
197

199 Yasemin Sim Esmen, The Orphaning of an Orphanage,TURKISH DAILY NEWS,
Dec. 1, 2007, available at http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-619523
(last visited Mar. 1, 2009). Notably, this was the first case ever filed by the Patriarchate against Turkey. For a general recount of the parties' arguments, see Ferentinou, supra note 195; Esmen, supra.
200 See TURKEY 2007 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 176, at 20.
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liament in November of 2006.201 The European Commission has noted that
this "new [proposed] law would [have] address[ed] a number of issues
which religious communities face with property management and acquisi'20 2
tion [in Turkey].
Additionally, the General Directorate of Foundations is noted to be
still at odds with the Patriarchate over the expropriation of certain properties. 203 Although there appears to be a long and tedious battle ahead of the
Patriarchate, it is crucial that each wrongful expropriation is litigated to its
end in Turkey, and then appealed to Strasbourg. Until then, Turkey will
have little motivation, other than European diplomatic pressure, to accomplish these changes prior to the death of the Patriarchal institution. This
litigation will serve a critical purpose: to reconfirm the legal identity of the
Patriarchate as a legal entity in and of itself, instead of a mere being created
at the convenience of the state to serve a dwindling Greek minority in
Istanbul.
Conclusion
Unquestionably, some portion of the dilemma that faces the Patriarchate today is a by-product of the Patriarchate's own passive and unorganized strategies of the past. However, with the initiation of the
Patriarchate's first case before the ECHR, it appears that the institution may
have finally traded hope hinged on stalemate diplomacy for practical legal
measures provided within the supranational court structure. With the Turkish government maintaining a tight grip around the throat of the most vital
of Patriarchal institutions, the trend of resorting to supranational litigation
to realize domestic rights is likely irreversible. Indeed, if the Patriarchate
intends to survive in the land it has called home for well over a thousand
years, it must adopt a strategy similar to that contained herein.
By implementing a more aggressive short-term strategy whereby
litigation in the ECHR is facilitated, the Patriarchate will position itself not
only legally to legitimize and preserve its own religious institutions in Turkey for the first time since 1453, but to emerge as a global leader in the
crusade for human rights and religious freedom in the twenty-first century.
Although the accomplishment of these goals will take great courage and
restraint on the part of the Patriarchate, Ankara, and the Turkish citizenry,
201

Id. at 20-21.

202

Id. at 21.

(2007), supra note 176. Additionally, in 2007 it
was reported that the GDF was "dealing with the fate of 2,235 properties owned by
147 minority foundations in Turkey [, including those of Orthodox Greeks] ......
Ferentinou, supra note 195.
203 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT
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all stand to gain significantly. The Patriarchate will finally enjoy the religious freedom and legal identity that it has sought in its native land since the
fall of Constantinople, and the Turkish citizenry will achieve a new level of
secular democracy and European economic and political integration that it
has collectively labored toward for so long.

